Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

12-2019

Uncertainty and Error in Combat Modeling, Simulation, and
Analysis
Jason A. Blake

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Operational Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Blake, Jason A., "Uncertainty and Error in Combat Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis" (2019). Theses and
Dissertations. 3165.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3165

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

UNCERTAINTY AND ERROR IN COMBAT MODELING,
SIMULATION, AND ANALYSIS
DISSERTATION

Mr. Jason A. Blake, USAF
AFIT-ENS-DS-19-D-019
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States
Government. This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to
copyright protection in the United States.

AFIT-ENS-DS-19-D-019

UNCERTAINTY AND ERROR IN COMBAT MODELING,
SIMULATION, AND ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Operational Sciences
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Mr. Jason A. Blake, USAF
AFIT-ENS-DS-19-D-019

19 December 2019

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

AFIT-ENS-DS-19-D-019

UNCERTAINTY AND ERROR IN COMBAT MODELING,
SIMULATION, AND ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Mr. Jason A. Blake, USAF

Committee Membership:
John O. Miller, PhD
Chairman
Jeffery D. Weir, PhD
Member
Douglas D. Hodson, PhD
Member

ADEDJI B. BADIRU, PhD
Dean, Graduate School of Engineering and Management

AFIT-ENS-DS-19-D-019

Abstract

Due to the infrequent and competitive nature of combat, several challenges present
themselves when developing a predictive simulation. First, there is limited data with which to
validate such analysis tools. Secondly, there are many aspects of combat modeling that are
highly uncertain and not knowable. This research develops a comprehensive set of techniques
for the treatment of uncertainty and error in combat modeling and simulation analysis.
First, Evidence Theory is demonstrated as a framework for representing epistemic
uncertainty in combat modeling output. Next, a novel method for sensitivity analysis of
uncertainty in Evidence Theory is developed. This sensitivity analysis method generates
marginal cumulative plausibility functions (CPFs) and cumulative belief functions (CBFs) and
prioritizes the contribution of each factor by the Wasserstein distance (also known as the
Kantorovich or Earth Mover’s distance) between the CBF and CPF. Using this method, a rank
ordering of the simulation input factors can be produced with respect to uncertainty. Lastly, a
procedure for prioritizing the impact of modeling choices on simulation output uncertainty in
settings where multiple models are employed is developed. This analysis provides insight into
the overall sensitivities of the system with respect to multiple modeling choices. The new
method does not make weakly predictive models strongly predictive models, but ensures a
plurality of perspectives can be reconciled during a modeling and simulation activity.
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UNCERTAINTY AND ERROR IN COMBAT MODELING,
SIMULATION, AND ANALYSIS
I.

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to explore the mechanisms by which uncertainties in
combat should be incorporated in a comprehensive analysis via modeling and simulation.
Existing approaches within the defense community for incorporating uncertain elements into
simulation studies are ad hoc with a significant number of tools that do not facilitate straight
forward exploration of system uncertainty. This problem is further compounded by the fact
that there are multiple overlapping simulation toolsets which, having been individually
developed by domain experts (aeronautics, signatures/sensing, communications, etc.), each
have slightly different representations of entities and environmental factors. This research
addresses the treatment of uncertainty and modeling error by leveraging Evidence Theory as a
framework to combine multiple, potentially conflicting sources for simulation factor settings
and represent the uncertainty these inputs induce on simulation output.
Modeling and simulation has been applied to a wide variety of challenging problems in
research, commercial industry and government. While drawbacks include lengthy development
time, software licensing fees and limited pools of qualified practitioners, it is particularly well
suited to problems where 1) experimentation with the real system is prohibitively expensive
(presumably more so than the modeling and simulation effort itself) and 2) there is no other
way in which to reasonably conduct the desired experiments. In the Department of Defense
(DoD), models of combat have been employed by systems and operations research analysts
1

since the 1960’s for exploring possible outcomes of hypothetical military conflict (Davis, 1995).
The fidelity of these models has ranged from simple mathematical relationships describing
attrition between two opposing forces (Lanchester, 1914) to high fidelity operator or hardware
in the loop simulations for exploration of detailed system configuration changes (Haase, 2014).
Over time the employment of combat simulations has expanded within the DoD including uses
in operations planning, requirements analysis, operational test and training.
Due to the infrequent and competitive nature of combat, several challenges present
themselves when developing a predictive simulation. First, there is limited data with which to
validate such analysis tools. While it is possible to validate individual pieces of a combat
simulation, such as the radar performance of a platform, to assess the integration of all mission
aspects against specific threats is a much more significant effort. Attempts have been made to
validate combat models in aggregate with historical data (Schramm, 2012), but this is of little
value as the models themselves require heavy modification to incorporate modern or future
forces, requiring further validation. Secondly, there are many aspects of combat modeling that
are highly uncertain and not knowable (an unresolvable uncertainty (Bankes, 1993)), such as
the exact tactics, techniques and procedures of an adversary force in response to a blue force
strike.
Recognizing these issues, Dewar (1996) developed a topology of uses of distributed, real
time simulations, shown in Figure 1, which delineated between strongly predictive and weakly
predictive uses of these simulations. Strongly predictive models are described as having a
demonstrated capacity to forecast outcomes with a high degree of accuracy. Examples of these
types of models include engineering or physics based models to predict part life, strength,
2

fatigue characteristics, etc. Alternatively, weakly predictive models suffer from moderate to
high levels of parametric, structural or other uncertainties. Yet, the model still captures enough
of the critical elements of the system under study to be useful in exploratory analysis. Millar
(2016) extended this idea, arguing that the taxonomy applied to combat models in general. Due
to the uncertainties described above, models of combat, to include Live-Virtual-Constructive
simulations (LVCs), are generally considered weakly predictive simulations and thought to be
most appropriately used for exploratory purposes.

Figure 1: Logical Uses of the Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) System (Dewar, 1996)

An alternate philosophy with respect to use of weakly predictive models can be found in
the weather and climate forecasting community. There are many models that predict the
weather or climate activity in existence. The issue is that individually, these models are not
accurate enough to be useful (Tebaldi, 2007). Each model includes different representations of
3

the underlying physics, different assumptions on initial conditions, and thus different strengths.
Fortunately, when these individual models are used in aggregate (referred to as a multi-model
ensemble) they become sufficiently accurate for use in predicting the weather on the local
news broadcast. Ensemble aggregation techniques range from simple averages across the
simulation responses, to more sophisticated techniques, like Bayesian model averaging (Ajami,
2007).
There are significant differences between models of climate phenomena and models of
combat. Chief among these is a source of validation data with which to compare the ensemble
and individual model performances. Lacking this data for combat, it still may be useful to
further consider the idea of employing multiple models of a similar combat situation and
leverage the various sources of responses for either evaluating internal consistency of the
ensemble or obtaining explicit bounds that incorporate various modeling perspectives. In the
same way that the inadequacy of individual weather models can be overcome through an
ensemble approach, the uncertainties and errors within combat simulations could be mitigated
through the use of a plurality of models.
Since there is limited data for combat model validation, the techniques for aggregation
in multi-model ensembles for weather forecasting are not appropriate. There would be no way
to confirm that the aggregated ensemble provides any predictive improvement over any
individual simulation response. But the point here is not to make weakly predictive models
strongly predictive models, but to improve the insight gained through a modeling and
simulation activity. The most appropriate use of data from an ensemble of similar mission level
effectiveness assessments may be to check for the internal consistency among them. This
4

would yield insight into the overall sensitivities of the system with respect to multiple modeling
choices. In a setting where multiple, similar mission level modeling and simulation studies are
being executed, this approach would also provide some quantitative backing to the aggregation
methods, which are typically the synthesis of reports by a trusted agent of the decision maker.
One drawback of this approach might be the perceived additional cost of having to pay
for multiple analyses of the same combat scenario. However, it is important to keep in mind the
financial cost of choosing the wrong alternative due to unexplored uncertainties associated
with modeling choices. Also, even in the current budget conscious environment, the DoD often
pays for the same analysis multiple times without any thought for how the results might be
cohesively integrated. At a recent review the schedule for a development planning effort was
presented. Included in the schedule were three different mission level assessments of similar
concepts against the same threat, with three different performing organizations, using three
different modeling and simulation software packages. While it appears this was planned
haphazardly, with program managers and engineers making use of available resources, it could
point to the programmatic feasibility of implementing an approach where multiple similar
assessments are commissioned and then quantitatively explored for discrepancies or
identification of bounds in the face of uncertainty.
There is a growing body of work in applying Evidence Theory as a framework for
systematic exploration and quantification of uncertainty in modeling and simulation.
Applications can be found in fields where there is near zero fault tolerance and uncertainty
exists within the system, such as space launch and nuclear power plant design (Oberkampf,
2002). Evidence Theory differs from probability theory in that likelihood is assigned to sets (i.e.
5

a range of parameter values) instead of being assigned to a probability density function. By
explicitly defining ranges of uncertain input parameters and propagating them through a
model, Evidence Theory bounds the true cumulative density function for a response by
empirically developed cumulative plausibility functions (CPF, upper bound on probability) and
cumulative belief functions (CBF, lower bound on probability) (Figure 2). Other methods within
Evidence Theory allow for a quantification of the “conflict” among varying sources of
information.

Figure 2: Depiction of Evidence Theory Bounds on CDF (Oberkampf, 2002)

1.1

Research Contributions
This research develops a comprehensive set of techniques for the treatment of

uncertainty and error in combat modeling and simulation analysis. This approach enables the
analyst to reconcile multiple and potentially conflicting perspectives, quantitatively. The
following are a summary of the primary research contributions described within:
6

1) Demonstration of Evidence Theory as a framework for representation of
epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling;
2) A novel procedure for sensitivity analysis of the uncertainty in modeling and
simulation output with respect to several epistemically uncertain factors; and
3) Development of a method to prioritize the impact of modeling choices (or error)
on simulation output uncertainty in settings where multiple models are
employed in a similar context.

1.2

Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation was prepared in k-paper format. It begins with an overarching

literature review of combat modeling and methods of uncertainty quantification. Examples
from the weather modeling and nuclear system safety are explored and compared with
proposals for analysis of uncertainty in combat modeling and simulation.
The next three chapters were designed to be completely severable, documenting three
distinct contributions to the field of combat modeling and analysis of uncertainty. Each of these
articles includes an introduction, complete literature review, methodology, results and
discussion, and conclusion section.
The first article demonstrates Evidence Theory as a framework for representing
epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling output. This approach unifies the analysis of
uncertainty in combat modeling with modern approaches to uncertainty analysis and provides
a direct mapping of input uncertainty to uncertainty in the distribution of simulation output. To
provide context for the Evidence Theory analysis, a traditional approach was employed in
assessment of uncertainty of Blue minus Red residual forces in a Lanchester model of conflict.
The results of both analyses were compared and contrasted.

7

In the second article, a new method for sensitivity analysis of uncertainty in Evidence
Theory was developed. This sensitivity analysis method generates marginal CPFs and CBFs and
prioritizes the contribution of each factor by the Wasserstein distance (also known as the
Kantorovich or Earth Mover’s distance) between the CBF and CPF. Using this method, a rank
ordering of the simulation input factors can be produced. This method is less susceptible to ties
when there are large uncertainties in outcomes with respect to the variables compared to
existing approaches in the literature.
The third article builds on the first two and uses Evidence Theory to prioritize the impact
of error or modeling choices on simulation output uncertainty in settings where multiple
models are employed. This analysis provides insight into the overall sensitivities of the system
with respect to multiple modeling choices. The new method does not make weakly predictive
models strongly predictive, but provides a mechanism for reconciling a plurality of modeling
perspectives during a simulation activity.

8

II.
2.1

Literature Review

Development and Use of Combat Models
Models of combat have been employed by systems and operations research analysts

since the 1960’s for exploring possible outcomes of hypothetical military conflict (Davis, 1995).
The fidelity of these models has ranged from simple mathematical relationships describing
attrition between two opposing forces (Lanchester, 1914) to high fidelity operator or hardware
in the loop simulations for exploration of detailed system configuration changes (Haase, 2014).
Over time the employment of combat simulations has expanded within the DoD including,
operations planning, requirements analysis, operational test and training. While each of these
applications are important, of particular interest for this document, are the class of models
used to support requirements analysis.

2.1.1

The Hierarchy of Combat Models

In the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD), combat models are frequently categorized into
campaign, mission, engagement and engineering levels of fidelity (see Figure 3). Of primary
concern in this paradigm, is the tradeoff between scope of the modeling effort and the fidelity
with which entities and their interactions are represented. In general, as models move up the
pyramid from engineering to campaign level analysis, the level of aggregation increases and the
of combat processes are represented with less resolution (or fidelity). The key for the analyst is
in appropriately choosing a model that best addresses the decision maker’s question.

9

Figure 3: Combat Modeling Hierarchy (Miller, 2016)

Outside the military domain, model aggregation techniques have been widely applied
for commercial purposes. Examples were found in transportation (Lee, 2004), ecology (Wu,
2002), materials science (NRC, 2008) and the electronics industry (Zhao, 2002). The aggregation
methods in these fields were often defined by simple relationships, such as aggregating
roadways that run in similar directions into a single “road”, or defined by physics based
relationships, such as in materials processing.
Rodriguez (2008) provides an overview of statistical techniques for aggregation and
disaggregation in combat modeling and simulation. Performance of each statistical technique
was compared against the full model (no aggregation). Use of fitted distributions or artificial
neural networks were not recommended and other statistical modeling methods produced
statistically similar results as the full model. The authors also acknowledged that non statistical
factors may be as important as statistical factors in choosing an appropriate aggregation
method, such as comprehensibility and skill and comfort of the analyst with the technique.

10

2.1.2

Live-Virtual-Constructive Modeling and Simulation

An alternate taxonomy of DoD combat simulations is the Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC)
paradigm. Live simulations are the class of simulations where real people operate real
equipment. An example of this would be in test where a real pilot in a real aircraft flying against
synthetic, computer generated targets. In a virtual simulation, real people operate simulated
systems or simulated people operate real systems. This is the class of simulation most
frequently associated with the LVC paradigm and crew familiarization and training are classic
examples of these activities. In the case where simulated people operate simulated systems,
these exercises are referred to as constructive simulations. The operations research community
within the DoD considers these analytic simulations and many variants have been developed
across the engagement, mission and campaign levels of fidelity. Some prominent examples
include THUNDER, STORM, Brawler, and Suppressor.
LVC exercises typically involve multiple geographically separated simulators connected
via a network. Flexible communication protocols have been developed over time to ensure the
vast array of assets intended for use in LVC simulations can adequately communicate. Popular
communications protocols in the LVC community include; the Test and Training Enabling
Architecture (TENA) (TENA, 2017), Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) (IEEE, 2012) and High
Level Architecture (HLA) (IEEE, 2000). Each of these standards has a core set of definitions
which specify the data to be transmitted across the network, the frequency with which to
transmit, and standards for handling entity to entity interactions (e.g. kill removal). Choice of
protocol is typically dependent on level of consistency required across the simulation network
nodes, with HLA typically employed in situations requiring high levels of shared state
11

consistency and TENA applied in Live situations where no guarantees can be made about state
consistency. Details on each of these protocols can be found in their respective specifications
(TENA, 2017; IEEE, 2012; IEEE, 2000).
As each of the independent nodes in an LVC exercise must process data across the
network, discrepancies may occur from site to site regarding the true state of the simulation
(Millar, 2016). To mitigate this outcome, software engineers can adjust the frequency with
which updates are sent to other players. These actions result in increasing overall network
traffic and processing burden on the simulators, potentially degrading the experience of the
human operator as the simulation software begins to process data slower than real time. This
phenomena is called the consistency-throughput tradeoff and has been studied extensively in
the context of DoD LVC events (Sandeep, 1999; Hodson, 2009).

2.2

Uncertainty in Combat Modeling and Simulation
2.2.1

Categories of Uncertainty

The distinction between uncertainty, variability and error in a modeling and simulation
study has not been consistently employed within the vocabulary of the analytical community. A
useful framework for discussing variability and error in a modeling and simulation study was
proposed by Oberkampf (2002). This framework proposes two kinds of uncertainty and the
notion of error within a modeling and simulation context that are akin to the colloquial use of
the terms uncertainty, variability, and error. Using their definition, aleatory uncertainty
“describes the inherent variation associated with a physical system or environment under
consideration” (Oberkampf, 2002:334). This could be thought of as the defect rate in a
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manufacturing process, where the same physical processes occur repeatedly, yet each part
does not come off the production line exactly to specification. Similar terms for aleatory
uncertainty include variability, stochastic variability, or irreducible uncertainty. A second
category of uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty, was defined as “the potential deficiency in any
phase or activity of the modeling process that is due to lack of knowledge” (Oberkampf,
2002:334). This category is difficult to conceptualize in most process flow modeling and
simulation contexts where any potential epistemic uncertainty could be resolved by simply
inspecting the process as it occurs. Epistemic uncertainty does manifest in the materials science
and engineering realm, where certain model parameters would require materials testing at high
temperatures and current methods preclude collecting this data.
These two types of uncertainty are related in that their impact manifests as either
simulation output variation or unquantified decision risk. It’s easy to see how a simulation
process that includes some representation of the aleatory uncertainties results in variation in
simulation output through replication, either within run or run-to-run. Epistemic uncertainties
can also induce variation in simulation output if assumptions regarding unknown aspects are
enumerated and relevant inputs varied within the study. Of more concern is when epistemic
uncertainties are not explicitly varied within a simulation, providing no insight into the
sensitivity of simulation responses to assumptions for the analyst, resulting in unquantified
decision risk. It is likely that the systematic varying of assumptions associated with epistemic
uncertainties will not cover all unique possibilities, but at least relative impacts can be
identified and presented to the study stakeholders to qualitatively include in their
deliberations.
13

The popular terminology typically stops at this point with variability commonly referring
specifically to aleatory uncertainty and uncertainty to epistemic uncertainty. There is a third
useful distinction to make alongside the two types of uncertainty that classifies cases where
choices in model abstraction and software implementation have an appreciable impact on the
form of the simulation. In the manufacturing example, the modeler could choose to implement
their simulation with either discrete event or agent based perspective. This decision, a choice
made in the process of abstracting the physical system for simulation, can change decisions
made based on modeling and simulation analysis in either a satisfactory or unsatisfactory
fashion. In this case, the effect on simulation output due to the selected modeling paradigm is
related to neither the natural variability of the process or elements that are unknowable
regarding the system under study. To account for this scenario, Oberkampf (2002) proposes the
concept of simulation error. They define simulation error as “a recognizable inaccuracy in any
phase or activity of modeling and simulation that is not due to lack of knowledge” (Oberkampf,
2002:334). Unfortunately this has the connotation that someone has done something “wrong”,
which may not be the case. While unacknowledged errors are the term that describes errors
made by the modeler, of more interest for this discussion are the acknowledged errors or
errors resulting from an intentional effort in the system abstraction or simulation
implementation process. The impact of error in a simulation study results in biased simulation
output or explainable deviation from “truth”. In a similar fashion to both epistemic and aleatory
uncertainty, certain forms of error could be systematically explored to identify sensitivities to
choices by the analyst.

14

2.2.2

Traditional Methods for Analysis with Uncertainties

Techniques have been developed to identify drivers of response variation and reduce
the width of confidence intervals to improve mean estimates for comparing two systems and
improve discriminatory capability such as; paired t-test, common random numbers, antithetic
variates, control variates, etc. For detailed procedures on executing these techniques, see (Law,
1999) or (Banks, 2010).
More recent work has focused on assessment of the overall effect of input uncertainty
on simulation output. Typically input distributions for simulation execution are “fit” based on
empirical data, and reduced to a closed form distribution to make simulation implementation
simple. Since these inputs are based on processes which are not guaranteed to specify the true
distribution, there is uncertainty in selection of distribution family and input parameters. Since
there are many such inputs in a typical simulation study, methods to identify the inputs with
largest impact are desirable. In Ankenman (2012), a random-effects model was employed to
estimate the ratio of input uncertainty relative to the standard error of the model. This idea is
extended in Song (2013), by developing a direct model of the variance contributors based on
variation in simulation response and an optimal run allocation for estimates of the marginal
variances.

2.2.3

Uncertainty in an LVC Context

In the context of LVC, of particular interest to the DoD analytical community are the
uncertainties and errors associated with distributed, real time simulation exercises. The primary
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components of an LVC can be broken down into three categories; 1) the computerized
simulation players, 2) the human and 3) the distributed simulation network (Figure 4).

(2)

(1)

(3)

Figure 4: Architecture of an LVC Exercise (Adapted from (Hodson, 2014))

If a particular distributed, real time simulation exercise contained a live system or actual
operational flight programs (OFP), they would be assumed to have the effect of reducing the
uncertainty and error associated with the system representation. This assumes that the live and
OFP systems are deterministic, the same input yields the same output. Humans are not
deterministic, and this is the reason why they are called out as a separate domain of
uncertainty and error.
The computerized simulation players include any aircraft simulator, but not the human,
and any constructive player, to include player behaviors and logic, in the simulation
environment. The uncertainties and errors associated within this domain would be similar to
those associated with a purely constructive simulation of combat. These could include
uncertainties in opposing force capabilities, size, and deployed location. Any one of these could
be categorized as parametric, structural, resolvable or unresolvable.
If there was an explicit treatment (i.e. systematic exploration and changing of
assumptions) of the identified uncertainties within this portion of the overall simulation,
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summary statistics (mean and variance) or confidence intervals of simulation responses could
be captured and exploited for analysis. Techniques developed for constructive simulations to
identify drivers of response variation (Ankenman, 2012; Song, 2013) or to improve mean
estimates for comparing two systems (Banks, 2010; Law, 1999), are not practical for distributed
simulation. These issues arise in an LVC as the software is either not centrally controlled or
readily modifiable to accommodate these techniques, and there are small numbers of runs and
highly correlated output (see Table 1).

Table 1: Summary of Sources of Uncertainty and Error in Modeling and Simulation Exercises
Source

Summary of Sources of Uncertainty and Error in Modeling and Simulation
Resulting Manifestation

Analysis Artifacts

Computerized Simulation Elements
- Lack of knowledge/data of - Decision risk
- Stochastic inputs
underlying physical system
- Stochastic variability
- Variation in simulation responses - Confidence
intervals, mean, variance
- Configuration
- Choices in abstraction
management/matched
fidelity

Human-in-the-Loop
- Learning effects
- Operator availability

- Non independent and identically
distributed observations
- Limited replications

- Lack of repeatability
Network Effects
- Uncontrolled processing of - Unverified events (non plausible
data
outcomes)
- Finite capacity

Compensation Methods

- Assessment of input uncertainty
(i.e. Song and Nelson)
- Replications
- Design of experiments

- Paired t test, antithetic variates,
control variates, hypothesis
testing

- Correlated response data

- Experimental planning

- Inputs map to multiple
responses
- Small sample sizes

- Design of experiments

- Inconsistent
entity state data

- Manual data review

- Bootstrapping

- "White cell" adjudication
- Qualitative apriori verification

Additionally, in combat modeling there are significant uncertainties associated with lack
of knowledge of the system, resulting in decision risk. There are no simple statistical techniques
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to reduce the risk associated with “unknown unknowns” (or “known unknowns”), outside of
conducting experiments across a wide range of threat scenarios or excursions.
Two unique sources of uncertainty and error in distributed, real time simulations include
the human operator in a virtual setting and the computer network that connects the players.
The employment of a human operator as part of the simulation system injects aleatory
uncertainty into the exercise due to the poor repeatability reported in LVC exercises. This
requires the analyst to develop strategies to combat learning curve effects, low numbers of
replications, and difficult to randomize experiments. The resulting data from these exercises
cannot be assumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid), and is likely highly
correlated. This leaves employment of common techniques that assume iid output suspect. The
limited availability of representative operators in conjunction with learning curve effects limits
the number of runs that can be practically or usefully run. There are many studies published in
the literature that highlight these issues (Haase, 2014; Gray, 2007; Hodson, 2014). Most point
to rigorous experimental planning as the best way to combat the effects of having a human
operator as part of the simulation system, but there is limited guidance on the topic.

2.2.4

Methodologies for Addressing Uncertainty in Combat Modeling

One approach to addressing the weakly predictive nature of combat models is
employment of multiresolution, multiperspective modeling. This, as described by Davis (2000),
is a family of models that describe similar phenomena at varying levels of resolution. A key
feature of the proposed modeling system would be that the family is consistent or mutually
calibrated within itself. This is in contrast with the current family of Air Force modeling and
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simulation tools which were not designed to be integrated from the outset and require
significant effort to do so.
An example of the implementation of multiresolution, multiperspective modeling was
discussed in (Davis, 2000). The analysis task was assessing the effectiveness of long range fires
in interdicting an invading land force. A multiresolution, multiperspective model called PGM
Effectiveness Model (PEM) was developed to assess the operational scenario, but was
calibrated based on results from legacy models JANUS and MADAM. Due to the differences in
fidelity and scope across JANUS, MADAM and PEM, a large effort to reconcile the output across
the three models was required. Because of this additional (and non-simulation) effort,
significant insight was gained in the post simulation reconciliation which clarified insight for the
decision maker.
In a similar vein, a National Academy of Science study advocated for a “multi-resolution
analysis” approach to support the Air Force intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
Capability Planning and Analysis process (NAS, 2012). This proposed framework is intended to
integrate elements of network analysis, sensor physics, cost analysis, operational analysis tools,
and mission effectiveness analysis (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Air Force ISR Multi Resolution Analysis Process (NAS, 2012)

The intent of the multi-resolution analysis framework is to provide a rigorous
foundation to early acquisition decisions for ISR. Current incarnations of the process include
some procedures for identifying and exploring uncertainties and advanced experimental design,
but commonly operate with a single constructive mission level modeling and simulation tool.
Wright (2004) presented a method for utilizing two radically different modeling
paradigms for analysis of strategic airlift. The first model was a simulation of cargo flow from on
load to offload point with explicit representation of the number of aircraft, routes, air based
infrastructure, and other resources. The second model was a large-scale linear program with
side constraints, which was initially developed to assess fleet adequacy and for use in
identifying system bottlenecks. While these models share common elements, the
representation of the real system is different for each model. For example, the simulation
models event durations as random variables while the optimization employs mean values for
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these quantities. The proposed framework assessed the convergence of these model outputs
based on iteratively modifying the individual models with the goal of reducing discrepancies
between them. When the models were sufficiently close in output, they were considered
covalid.

2.3

Design, Development, and Analysis of Model Ensembles
In the weather domain, seasonal forecasts have been shown to have better predictive

capability when several independent models are combined, commonly referred to as a multimodel ensemble (Tebaldi, 2007), than when the individual predictions of those models are
taken alone. There are several domain specific phenomena that contribute to the difficulties
with single model analyses and the success of multi-model approaches, some of which are
(Palmer, 2004):
o The physics of weather is well understood, but the phenomena are chaotic and
models are sensitive to initial conditions
o Solutions to the partial differential equations that describe weather phenomena
must be reduced to analytically tractable forms, which introduces computation
error in final solutions
o There are numerous ways to implement approximations of the underlying
physics and numerical approximations
o There is no underlying framework from which a pdf of model uncertainty can be
estimated.
Developers of multi-model ensembles must consider both the number and composition of
models within the ensemble as well as the method of data aggregation and assessment of
ensemble predictive skill.
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Multi-model superiority is not only due to error compensation, but primarily by its
improved constancy and reliability across the entire predictive region (Hagedorn, 2005). A
particular ensemble may not be the best model at each point within the predictive region, but
generally outperforms any given individual model over the full range of cases. The success of
multi-model methods in the weather community has led to the development of analogous
approaches in prediction of disease outbreak (Morse, 2005) and rainfall runoff (Ajami, 2007).

2.3.1

Ensemble Construction

The analysis of multi-model ensembles rely on the principle that the component models
are structurally independent from each other (Palmer, 2004). Otherwise, specific bias may be
overrepresented (or underrepresented) in the ensemble and have an outsized impact on the
aggregated results. This ensemble property is not necessarily knowable and ignored in practice
(Hagedorn, 2005) with suitability of results a product of the validation process. Independence
of a multi-model ensemble is often taken to be implied by the fact that various groups have
independently developed their own models, and it follows that their construction methods
were not influenced by others development efforts. These variations in model physics and
numerical computation methods play a substantial role in generating the full spectrum of
possible solutions.
Along with independence of the component models, the aggregator must also manage
the number of models within the ensemble. Larger ensemble sizes are generally considered
better, with widely used climate models reporting between 7 (Palmer, 2004) and 11 members
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(Kirtman, 2014). Research has shown that predictive skill scores grow faster with ensemble size
when membership is less than 30, and saturates with large numbers of members.

2.3.2

Statistics of Aggregation

Data aggregation techniques for analysis of multi-model ensemble output range from
simple averages to more advanced Bayesian techniques. Model output can vary from model to
model in terms of variation (or range) and mean. The impact of modeling decisions can change
either of these features, changing the variation of the output or inducing bias in the response.
Using historical climate data, it is possible to correct for systematic spatial shifts of each model
within the ensemble (Doblas‐Reyes, 2005). Canonical correlation analysis and variance inflation
techniques have both been demonstrated to enhance the reliability of multi-model forecasts.
The simplest implemented multi-model forecast is developed by combining individual
contributors with equal weight (Hagedorn, 2005; Kirtman, 2014). Extensions of this procedure
with optimal weights developed for each contributor based on historical prediction capability
have been developed, but it has proved difficult to calculate robust weights with the available
training datasets. Methods that only output the grand mean lose the information associated
with the differences in variation across models, motivating probabilistic techniques for data
aggregation (e.g. Bayesian model averaging, etc.).

2.3.3

Assessment of Skill

Verification and validation of multi-model ensembles face similar issues as any other
modeling and simulation activity. An identified key to success lies in combining independent
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and skillful models each with their own strengths and weaknesses (Hagedorn, 2005). Tebaldi
(2007) outlines several key processes for verification and validation of model ensembles, to
include a comparison of ensemble prediction to historical data, evaluation of theoretical
correctness of individual model behavior, and perceived trust of the model. Generally, most
climate models agree reasonably well with present day mean climate, but many diverge
significantly in predictions of future climate.
To aid in the validation process, Palmer (2004) developed a modular verification system,
comprised of various indices of predictive skill with metrics for both deterministic and
probabilistic (output is distribution of outcomes) simulations. Deterministic validation metrics
included anomaly correlation coefficient, root mean square skill score, and mean square skill
score (Hagedorn, 2005). Probabilistic simulation skill is assessed with reliability diagrams, ROC
skill score, Brier score, and ranked probability skill score, among several others. Issues with
validation of probabilistic forecasts beyond those associated with a deterministic simulation
include; improper estimates of probabilities from small-sized ensembles, insufficient number of
forecast cases, and imperfect reference values due to observation errors (Doblas‐Reyes, 2005).
The choice of best ensemble is sensitive to choice of model output (metric) and skill
assessment method (Hagedorn, 2005), with no single measure being sufficient for comparing
forecast quality across all possible ensembles (Doblas‐Reyes, 2005). Skill scores have been
demonstrated to grow faster with ensemble size when membership is less than 30, saturates
with large numbers of members (Palmer, 2004), and multi-model ensembles have been shown
to be systematically more skillful especially, when scores are averaged over large regions or
long periods of time.
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2.3.4

Criticisms

Tebaldi (2007) offers several criticisms of employment of multi-model ensembles. One
was the notion that the performance of a forecast improves by averaging multiple models is
based on the assumption the models are independent and that the errors cancel as the
averages are taken. Since many models in the weather community are based on a similar
understanding of the physics of weather, they are related at some level, thus not truly
independent and biased.
Second is that model ensembles are often assembled out of convenience (Tebaldi,
2007), with no systemic approach to sampling models for the ensemble. This can lead to
unexplainable changes in predicted performance by swapping out models in an ensemble.
Stated another way, there is no practical guarantee that all model uncertainties are accounted
for (and suitably independent) within a given multi-model ensemble (Kirtman, 2014) and
additional models may change the aggregated results.

2.3.5

Applications

Both American (Kirtman, 2014) and European (Palmer, 2004) multi-model ensembles
have been successfully developed to aid in developing accurate climate forecasts. Typical
output of these systems includes sea surface temperature, two mile temperature and
precipitation rates, with aggregation occurring via simple averaging techniques. The component
models’ configuration, resolution, etc. are left to the forecast providers and not centrally
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managed by the aggregator. Each of these ensembles have demonstrated smaller prediction
errors than any of their individual contributors over the full range of experimental conditions.
Bayesian methods have been demonstrated as a technique for analysis of multi-model
ensembles of climate characteristics. Smith (2009) developed a Bayesian framework as an
objective method of quantifying output uncertainty in a multi-model ensemble using
uninformative priors. In a similar vein, Tebaldi (2005) developed a Bayesian approach with
hyperprior distribution parameters to assess the inter-model agreement of regional
temperature predictions. This approach was used to generate univariate regression models of
temperature change for each individual region and a multivariate regression model where the
response was the vector of all regions’ temperature change.
Another use of multi-model ensembles was found in Ajami (2007), where Bayesian
model averaging was used to create a multi-model ensemble for prediction of rainfall run-off.
Bayesian model averaging is a technique that weights the individual models by the likelihood
that the model matches a comparison metric. The comparison metric could be historical data or
a baseline model that is used as a cross validation source. Ajami (2007) built a model ensemble
comprised of three hydrologic models and performed a validation based on historical data. It
was found that the model ensemble improved the number of empirical observations that were
within a 95% confidence interval of the model estimate by over 300% (from a maximum 22%
capture to 76.3% capture).
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2.4

Evidence Theory
There is a growing body of work in applying Evidence Theory, also known as Dempster-

Shafer Theory, as a framework for systematic exploration and quantification of uncertainty in
modeling and simulation. The theory was first introduced by Dempster (1967) and later codified
by Shafer (1976). Applications can be found in fields where there is near zero fault tolerance
and uncertainty exists within the system, such as space launch and nuclear power plant design
(Sentz, 2002). Evidence Theory differs from probability theory in that likelihood is assigned to
sets (i.e. a range of parameter values) instead of being assigned to a probability density
function. By explicitly defining ranges of uncertain input parameters and propagating them
through a model, Evidence Theory bounds the true cumulative density function for a response.
There are three key functions in Evidence Theory; the basic probability assignment function
(bpa or m), the Belief function (Bel) and the Plausibility function (Pl).
In general the basic probability assignment is not equivalent to probability as discussed
in classical probability theory (although connections exist (Sentz, 2002)). Similarly to classical
probability theory, the basic probability assignment is a mapping of all sets (X, the power set) to
the interval [0, 1] and the sum of all assignments across subsets is 1. Formally, this is
represented as:

𝑚𝑚: 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) → [0, 1]

(1)

∑𝐴𝐴 ∈𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) 𝑚𝑚(𝐴𝐴) = 1

(3)

𝑚𝑚(∅) = 0
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(2)

Using this basic probability assignment, upper and lower bounds for an interval can be
calculated. The lower bound (or Belief), for a set A (subset of X), is the sum of all basic
probability assignments of the proper subsets (B) of the set of interest (A).

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝐴𝐴) = ∑𝐵𝐵|𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵)

(4)

The upper bound (or Plausibility) is the sum of all the basic probability assignments of the sets
(B) that intersect the set of interest (A).

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) = ∑𝐵𝐵|𝐵𝐵 ∩ 𝐴𝐴 ≠ ∅ 𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵)
2.4.1

(5)

Types of Evidence

There are many ways to combine evidence from multiple different sources in Evidence
Theory, but the key to appropriately applying the right combination rules is determining the
type of evidence being combined. Sentz (2002) identifies four types of evidence, with varying
levels of conflict: consonant, consistent, arbitrary, and disjoint.
Consonant evidence is a collection of nested sets of data where the elements of the
smallest set are included in the next larger set, which is included in the next largest set, etc.
(Sentz, 2002) (see Figure 6).
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A
B

E
C
D

Figure 6: Consonant Evidence

Consistent evidence is the situation where at least one set is common to all other sets
(Sentz, 2002). This is illustrated in Figure 7, where set A is a subset of each other set B, C, D and
E.

A

E

B

C
D
Figure 7: Consistent Evidence

Arbitrary evidence is the situation where there is no set common to all subsets (Sentz,
2002). This is illustrated in Figure 8, where there are clearly subsets that overlap but no set is
common to all other sets.
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A

E
D
Figure 8: Arbitrary Evidence

Disjoint evidence corresponds to the situation where no two sets overlap (Sentz, 2002)
(see Figure 9).

B

E

C
A

D

Figure 9: Disjoint Evidence

As is apparent from inspection of Figures 6 through 9, each configuration of evidence
results in a different level of conflict across the available evidence. In the condition where the
evidence is disjoint, the level of conflict is relatively high. Where in the case of consonant
evidence, all sets share a common set, indicating relatively lower conflict. Consistent and
arbitrary set configurations would exhibit a varying level of conflict, depending on the situation.
These would conceivably exhibit levels of conflict between disjoint and consonant evidence.
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2.4.2

Rules of Combination

The rules of combination in Evidence Theory allow data to be aggregated across
multiple, potentially conflicting sources within a common frame of discernment. For the
simulation context discussed in this research, these sources could be input for a common
parameter from a variety of subject matter experts (SMEs), a set of epistemically uncertain
inputs for an individual model, or the individual models in an ensemble. This process assumes
that the sources are independent (Shafer, 1976), however this requirement is not rigorously
established in practice (Tebaldi, 2007). There are many rules for combining parameter
estimates in Evidence Theory, the key to providing credible insight in a given analysis is to
understand or choose how conflict between sources should be considered. A survey of relevant
combination rules is provided below.
Dempster’s combination rule was the original combination operator that drove the
conception of Evidence Theory (Dempster, 1967). Using Dempster’s combination rule, the basic
probability assignments from two (or more) sources is combined with a purely conjunctive
operation. The formal definition of this operation (𝑚𝑚12 ) is below:
𝑚𝑚12 =

∑𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)
1− 𝐾𝐾

𝑚𝑚12 (∅) = 0

𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 = ∅

where 𝐾𝐾 = ∑𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=∅ 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)

(6)
(7)
(8)

It is important to note that this operation results in an aggregated mass only for intervals which
overlap, giving zero mass to regions where evidence existed but did not overlap with another
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method. The measure of non-overlapping probability mass (or conflict) is represented by the
computation of K.
The aggregated masses are normalized based on K to achieve a basic probability
assignment function that resembles a probability density function from classical probability
theory. Unfortunately, this choice can lead to counterintuitive results in situations involving
high levels of conflict. These shortcomings are detailed in (Zadeh, 1984). Recognizing the
potential pitfall, numerous other combination rules have been developed which account for
level of conflict differently.
Yager’s combination rule does not normalize the probability mass assignments by the
degree of conflict (Yager, 1987) and distinguishes between the basic probability assignment and
a new construct, the ground probability assignment (q). The ground probability assignment
represents the evidence as provided, without being inflated based on conflict. As such, the sum
of the ground probability assignments over all sets will not necessarily equal 1. The formal
definition of the ground probability assignment is provided below:

𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴) =

� 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)

(9)

𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=∅

Due to the associativity of Yager’s operator, multiple pieces of evidence can be combined
simultaneously. This result is shown in equation (10).

𝑞𝑞(𝐴𝐴) =

�

∩𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 =𝐴𝐴

𝑚𝑚1 (𝐴𝐴1 )𝑚𝑚2 (𝐴𝐴2 ) … 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 (𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 )
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(10)

In Yager’s construct for combining evidence, conflict is assigned to the universal set, with 𝑞𝑞(∅)
(see equation (11)) having the interpretation of the degree of ignorance in the data.

𝑞𝑞(∅) =

� 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)

(11)

𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=∅

Yager’s combination rule is equivalent to Dempster’s combination rule when the degree of
conflict is zero.
The Mixing Rule of combination is a popular mechanism for aggregation of disjunctive
evidence (see equation (12)). This rule averages the masses (mi) associated with a particular
interval across all i estimates (i from 1 to n). The individual estimates can be weighted based on
reliability by the multiplier, w, where each wi is the reliability associated with the ith source.

𝑛𝑛

1
𝑚𝑚1…𝑛𝑛 (𝐴𝐴) = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑛𝑛

(12)

𝑖𝑖=1

In contrast with Dempster’s Rule of combination, evidence in conflict is preserved in the
resulting BPA. Said another way, the full range of possibilities expressed in the sources are
represented in the final BPA. This feature is particularly beneficial where the application of
evidence theory is not to identify the most likely distribution of a particular metric, but to
express the full range the distribution could be.
There are many additional rules for combining evidence, such as; Discount and Combine
(Sentz, 2002), Convolutive x-Averaging (Sentz, 2002) (a generalization of the average for scalar
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numbers), and the qualitative combination rule (Yao, 1994) (rank ordered process for
aggregating data).

2.5

Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian analysis is a method of statistical inference that allows hypotheses regarding

uncertain quantities to be updated based on observed or new information. In the frequentist
paradigm, the uncertainty in many real word quantities are reduced to singular values, where
they are represented as distributions with unknown parameters in a Bayesian paradigm.
Gelman (2014) defines a three step process for any Bayesian data analysis effort:
1. Setting up a full probability model. In this phase, a joint probability distribution is
established for all quantities of interest in the analysis.
2. Conditioning on observed data. This involves calculating the posterior distribution,
which is the distribution of the unobserved quantity of interest conditioned on the
observed data.
3. Evaluating the fit of the model and implications of the resulting posterior distribution.
This phase is where insight is extracted from the constructed model, reasonableness of
conclusions are assessed, and sensitivity analysis is executed relative to assumptions
made throughout previous steps.
2.5.1

Bayes’ Rule (Gelman, 2014)

The central theme of Bayesian analysis is to make probability statements about some
quantity θ given some data y. This quantity can be expressed as the product of two different
probability densities, known as the prior distribution (𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃)) and the data distribution (𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝜃𝜃)),
as shown below:

𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃, 𝑦𝑦) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝜃𝜃)
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(13)

By conditioning on the obtained data y and applying Bayes’ rule, the expression for the
posterior density is obtained:

𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦) =

𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃, 𝑦𝑦)
𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝜃𝜃)
=
𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)
𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)

(14)

The term p(y) is a constant, as it does not depend on 𝜃𝜃 and is frequently written as:
𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦) ∝ 𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝜃𝜃)

(15)

Before the data y are collected, the probability density function of y is

𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦) = � 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦, 𝜃𝜃)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(16)

= � 𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝜃𝜃)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
This is also referred to as the prior predictive distribution as it is not conditional on the
collected data. If inference about 𝑦𝑦� after y data have been collected is desired, the posterior
predictive distribution is derived (see equation (17)).
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� 𝑦𝑦) = � 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦�, 𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|

(17)

= � 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦�|𝜃𝜃, 𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= � 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦�|𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
Using this distribution, inference about the unknown but observable quantities in an analysis
can be made with updated quantity estimates based on observations of the process.

2.5.2

Dirichlet Processes and Bayesian Histograms

Practical application of Bayesian analysis requires the ability to compute the integrals in
equation (16), which is not always easy or straight forward. Significant research efforts have
been undertaken to approximate these integrals, employing Monte Carlo and/or markov chain
methods (Gelman, 2014). Another line of research has identified convenient probability density
functions for which simple conjugate prior distributions exist. Of specific interest to this paper is
the analysis of simulation output, which has been turned into interval data for histogram
comparison. This results in the simulation output being modeled as a multinomial distribution,
where the possible outcomes are equivalent to the histogram bins. While other Bayesian
approaches exist that may not require strict bins widths to be defined (Gelman, 2014), these
are reserved for future research.
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The multinomial distribution, a generalization of the binomial distribution is used to
describe data for which each outcome is one of k discrete possibilities. Assigning y as the count
of observations of each outcome k, then the posterior density is:

𝑘𝑘

(18)

𝑦𝑦

𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦) ∝ � 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗 ,
𝑗𝑗=1

where the sum of probabilities, ∑𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 , is 1 and is typically considered to implicitly condition
on the number of observations, ∑𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛. The conjugate prior of the multinomial

distribution is a generalization of the beta distribution, known as the Dirichlet. For which the
probability density function is:

𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 −1

𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃|𝛼𝛼) ∝ ∏𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗

,

(19)

where θj ’s are greater than 0 and sum to 1. The resulting prior distribution for the θj ’s is
Dirichlet with parameters 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 .

Bayesian analysis of interval data produced via simulation can be accomplished through

the modeling as a Bayesian histogram. Suppose a set of points ξ = (ξ0 , ξ1 , … , ξ𝑘𝑘 ) have been
defined which identify the intervals for the histogram estimate, with ξ0 < ξ1 < … < ξ𝑘𝑘 and
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ∈ [ξ0 , ξ𝑘𝑘 ]. A probability model representation of the histogram is as follows:
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𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦) = �

𝑘𝑘

ℎ=1

1𝜀𝜀ℎ−1 <𝑦𝑦≤𝜀𝜀ℎ

𝜋𝜋ℎ
(𝜀𝜀ℎ − 𝜀𝜀ℎ−1 )

(20)

with 𝜋𝜋 = ( 𝜋𝜋1 , … , 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 ) is an unknown probability vector. To complete the Bayes specification, a
Dirichlet( 𝑎𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 ) prior distribution for 𝜋𝜋 is assumed,

∏𝑘𝑘ℎ=1 Γ(𝑎𝑎ℎ )

𝑘𝑘

𝑎𝑎 −1
� 𝜋𝜋ℎ ℎ
𝑘𝑘
Γ(∑ℎ=1 𝑎𝑎ℎ )
ℎ=1

𝑝𝑝(𝜋𝜋|𝑎𝑎) =

(21)

The hyperparameters, π, can be expressed as a = απ0 , where
𝑎𝑎1
𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋|𝑎𝑎) = 𝜋𝜋0 = �
,…,
�
∑ℎ 𝑎𝑎ℎ
∑ℎ 𝑎𝑎ℎ

(22)

a is the prior average and α is a scale parameter and interpreted as a prior sample size.
The posterior distribution is then calculated as:

𝑝𝑝(𝜋𝜋|𝑦𝑦)
𝑘𝑘

(23)
𝑎𝑎 −1

∝ � 𝜋𝜋ℎ ℎ
ℎ=1
𝑘𝑘

𝑖𝑖:𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ∈(𝜀𝜀ℎ−1 ,𝜀𝜀ℎ ]

𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛𝑛ℎ −1

∝ � 𝜋𝜋ℎ ℎ
ℎ=1

�
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𝜋𝜋ℎ
(𝜀𝜀ℎ − 𝜀𝜀ℎ−1 )

Which by definition is Dirichlet(a1 + 𝑛𝑛1 , … , a𝑘𝑘 + 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 ), where 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘 is the number of observations

within the hth histogram bin. This approach is an incremental step toward development of fully
non parametric Bayesian density estimation, which is reserved as a topic for future research.
Starting with equation (17), the posterior predictive distribution can be derived for this
process.

𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦� = 𝑖𝑖|𝑦𝑦) = � 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦�|𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝(𝜃𝜃|𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(24)

= � 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝜃𝜃|𝑁𝑁 + 𝑎𝑎)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
=
2.5.3

𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘
∑𝑗𝑗=1 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 + 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗

Applications

A survey of Bayesian methods in the context of discrete event modeling and simulation
is provided in Chick (2006). These topics include uncertainty analysis, ranking and selection,
input modeling and metamodeling. In the combat simulation domain, dynamic Bayesian
networks were employed to analyze data created via an air combat simulation called X-Brawler
(Poropudas, 2007). The data were input into a dynamic Bayesian network and used to study
various courses of action within a combat situation. Kelleher (2014) developed a method using
bootstrapping techniques to reduce the number of simulation runs required to train a dynamic
Bayesian network as a simulation meta-model. This approach was applied to an analysis of a
cruise missile defense scenario using the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS)
simulation framework.
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2.6

Summary
Significant uncertainties prevent the development of predictive combat models. Several

approaches have been published in the literature for proper use of combat models given these
uncertainties. These approaches deemphasize quantitative use of simulation output and
advocate for them as a tool for searching for regions of relative benefit. Other domains have
employed more quantitative approaches to accounting for uncertainty. Specifically, the space
and nuclear power communities have employed Evidence Theory as a tool for quantifying the
impact of uncertain inputs on uncertainty in simulation output. These tools may provide a
means for further understanding the relationships between the uncertainties in combat
modeling inputs and the uncertainty in combat modeling outputs.
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III.

Analysis of Epistemic Uncertainty in Combat Modeling and Simulation

3.1

Introduction
Modeling and simulation has been applied to a wide variety of challenging problems in

research, commercial industry and government. While drawbacks include lengthy development
time, software licensing fees and limited pools of qualified practitioners, it is particularly well
suited to problems where 1) experimentation with the real system is prohibitively expensive
(presumably more so than the modeling and simulation effort itself) and 2) there is no other
way in which to reasonably conduct the desired experiments. In the Department of Defense
(DoD), models of combat have been employed by systems and operations research analysts
since the 1960’s for exploring possible outcomes of hypothetical military conflict (Davis, 1995).
The fidelity of these models has ranged from simple mathematical relationships describing
attrition between two opposing forces (Lanchester, 1914) to high fidelity operator or hardware
in the loop simulations for exploration of detailed system configuration changes (Haase, 2014).
Over time the employment of combat simulations has expanded within the DoD including,
operations planning, requirements analysis, operational test and training.
Due to the infrequent and competitive nature of combat, several challenges present
themselves when using simulation as a tool for analyzing combat. First, there is limited data
with which to validate such analysis tools. While it may be possible to validate individual pieces
of a combat simulation, such as the performance of a specific radar on a specific platform, to
assess the integration of all mission aspects against current and future threats is a much more
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significant effort. Attempts have been made to validate combat models in aggregate with
historical data (Schramm, 2012), but this is of little value as the models themselves require
heavy modification to incorporate modern or future forces, requiring their own distinct
validation. Secondly, there are many aspects of combat modeling that are highly uncertain and
not knowable (an unresolvable uncertainty (Bankes, 1993)), such as the exact tactics,
techniques and procedures of an adversary force in response to a blue force strike.
Within the combat modeling community there have been several suggestions for exploring
uncertainties associated with the domain (Bankes, 1993; Davis, 2000; Dewar, 1996). However,
the output of these approaches does not clearly communicate the uncertainties that are buried
within the inputs. The purpose of this research is to improve representation of uncertainty in
combat modeling and simulation through application of Evidence Theory. It is anticipated that
employment of such techniques will enable rapid visualization of system uncertainties and aid
in interpretation of simulation output.
Applications of Evidence Theory can be found in fields where there is near zero fault
tolerance and uncertainty exists within the system, such as space launch and nuclear power
plant design (Oberkampf, 2002). In contrast with classical probability theory, likelihood is
assigned to sets (i.e. a range of parameter values) instead of being assigned to a probability
density function. By explicitly defining ranges of uncertain input parameters and propagating
them through a model, Evidence Theory bounds the true cumulative density function for a
response by empirically developed cumulative plausibility functions (CPF, upper bound on
probability) and cumulative belief functions (CBF, lower bound on probability).
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This chapter is organized into five major sections: Introduction, Background, Probabilistic
Analysis of Epistemic Uncertainty, Analysis of Epistemic Uncertainty via Evidence Theory, and
Conclusion. The Introduction provides a general overview of the context for the research in
exploration and quantification of epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling. This section
includes a brief introduction and analysis of issues in the literature and a synopsis of research
contributions. The Background section provides a brief overview of Lanchester’s Equations and
their history in Combat Modeling along with an introduction to Evidence Theory. Traditional
and novel approaches to analyzing uncertainty in combat modeling are presented in the
Probabilistic Analysis of Uncertainty and Analysis of Epistemic Uncertainty via Evidence Theory
sections, respectively. For each, the general method, results, and discussion of efficacy are
provided. In the Conclusions section, a summary of the research context, contributions, and
future work are identified.

3.2

Background
3.2.1

Lanchester’s Equations

Lanchester’s Square Law (equations (25) and (26)) were developed to model combat
between two homogeneous forces where both forces use aimed fire, target acquisition time
does not depend on the number of targets, target acquisition time is factored into the
firepower coefficients, and the firepower coefficients are constant over time (MORS, 1994).

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

= −α ∗ y(t) where x(0) = X0
= −β ∗ x(t) where y(0) = Y0
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(25)
(26)

The equations model the change of a given force level (say x(t)) as a function of the opposing
force level (y(t)) over time, given initial force sizes and estimates of the firepower coefficients.
Using these equations, various quantities of interest can be explored, such as: who wins the
conflict, residual forces, and duration of conflict (Figure 10).

Example of Lanchester's Model of Armed Conflict

Force Size

700
600

Blue Force (x)

500

Red Force (y)

400
300

Lanchester
Parameters:
x0 = 800

200

y0 = 500
α = 0.15

100
0

β = 0.45
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Time

Figure 10: Example of Lanchester’s Model of Armed Conflict

Lanchester’s equations are appealing in part, due to their simplicity, transparency and
ease of implementation. Combat analysts have employed them in assessments of several
conflicts including; the Ardennes Campaign, the Battle of Kursk, and Iwo Jima (Bracken, 1995;
Lucas, 2004; Schramm, 2012). However, there are numerous sources in the literature that
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identify deficiencies of a Lanchester model of armed conflict (Tolk, 2012). Taylor (1983)
consolidates these into a single list, several of which are provided below as reference:
•

No force movement

•

Not verified by history

•

No way to predict attrition rate coefficients

•

Tactical decision processes not considered

•

Battlefield intelligence not considered

•

Command, control, and communications not considered

•

Effects of terrain not considered

•

Target priority/fire allocation not explicitly considered

•

Noncombat losses are not considered
Despite these criticisms, many variants of Lanchester’s equations have been developed.

Extensions include incorporation of heterogeneous forces, stochastic attrition processes,
reinforcements, logistics and maintenance and breakpoints (Tolk, 2012). In a more modern
setting, the effects of network disruptions were represented as piecewise firepower
coefficients (Schramm, 2012), enabling assessment of the impact of cyber effects on combat
outcomes. Kelton (2010) describes a Lanchester model with stopping levels and stochastic
reinforcements for both red and blue forces. This model was designed for implementation and
analysis in the Arena modeling and simulation package.
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3.2.2

Evidence Theory

There is a growing body of work in applying Evidence Theory, and specifically DempsterShafer (D-S) theory, as a framework for systematic exploration and quantification of uncertainty
in modeling and simulation. The theory was first introduced by Dempster (1967) and later
codified by Shafer (1976). Applications can be found in several scientific fields, such as space
launch and nuclear power plant design (Sentz, 2002). Evidence theory differs from probability
theory in that likelihood is assigned to sets (i.e. a range of parameter values) instead of being
assigned to a probability density function. By explicitly defining ranges of uncertain input
parameters and propagating them through a model, evidence theory bounds the true
cumulative density function for a response. There are three key functions in Evidence Theory;
the basic probability assignment function (BPA or m), the Belief function (Bel) and the
Plausibility function (Pl).
In general the basic probability assignment is not equivalent to probability as discussed
in classical probability theory (although connections exist (Sentz, 2002)). Similarly to classical
probability theory, the basic probability assignment is a mapping of all sets (X, the power set) to
the interval [0, 1] and the sum of all assignments across subsets is 1. Formally, this is
represented as:

𝑚𝑚: 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) → [0, 1]

(27)

∑𝐴𝐴 ∈𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) 𝑚𝑚(𝐴𝐴) = 1

(29)

𝑚𝑚(∅) = 0
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(28)

Using these basic probability assignments, upper and lower bounds for an interval can be
calculated. The lower bound (or Belief), for a set A (subset of X), is the sum of all basic
probability assignments of the proper subsets (B) of the set of interest (A).

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝐴𝐴) = ∑𝐵𝐵|𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵)

(30)

The upper bound (or Plausibility) is the sum of all the basic probability assignments of the sets
(B) that intersect the set of interest (A).

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) = ∑𝐵𝐵|𝐵𝐵 ∩ 𝐴𝐴 ≠ ∅ 𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵)

(31)

The rules of combination in Evidence Theory allow data to be aggregated across
multiple, potentially conflicting sources within a common frame of discernment. This process
assumes that the sources are independent (Shafer, 1976), however this requirement is not
rigorously established in practice (Tebaldi, 2007). There are many rules for combining evidence;
the key to identifying the most appropriate method is to determine how conflict between
sources should be considered. A survey of relevant combination rules is provided below.
Dempster’s (1967) combination rule was the original combination operator that drove
the conception of Evidence Theory. Using Dempster’s combination rule, the basic probability
assignments from two (or more) sources is combined with a purely conjunctive operation. The
formal definition of this operation (𝑚𝑚12 ) is:
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𝑚𝑚12 =

∑𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)
1− 𝐾𝐾

𝑚𝑚12 (∅) = 0

𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 = ∅

where 𝐾𝐾 = ∑𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=∅ 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)

(32)
(33)
(34)

It is important to note that this operation results in an aggregated mass only for intervals which
overlap, giving zero mass to regions where evidence existed but did not overlap with another
method. The measure of non-overlapping probability mass (or conflict) is represented by the
computation of K.
The aggregated masses are normalized based on K to achieve a basic probability
assignment function that resembles a probability density function from classical probability
theory. Unfortunately, this choice can lead to counterintuitive results in situations involving
high levels of conflict. These shortcomings are detailed in (Zadeh, 1984). Recognizing the
potential pitfall, numerous other combination rules have been developed which account for
level of conflict differently (see (Sentz, 2002) and (Yao, 1994) for many examples).
The Mixing Rule of combination is a popular mechanism for aggregation of disjunctive
evidence (see equation (35)). This rule averages the masses (mi) associated with a particular
interval across all i estimates (i from 1 to n). The individual estimates can be weighted based on
reliability by the multiplier, w, where each wi is the reliability associated with the ith source.
𝑛𝑛

1
𝑚𝑚1…𝑛𝑛 (𝐴𝐴) = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
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(35)

In contrast with Dempster’s rule of combination, evidence in conflict is preserved in the
resulting BPA. Said another way, the full range of possibilities expressed in the sources are
represented in the final BPA. This feature is particularly beneficial where the application of
evidence theory is not to identify the most likely distribution of a particular metric, but to
express the full range the distribution could be.

3.3

Probabilistic Analysis of Epistemic Uncertainty
3.3.1

Methodology

In this section, we analyze a hypothetical military conflict modeled by Lanchester’s
Square Law with a stopping level (a force level for both red and blue where the conflict ends).
For this model there are 6 key inputs; initial force levels, attrition coefficients, and stopping
level for both red and blue sides. These inputs are presumed to be epistemically uncertain and
that the analyst has been given ranges for each input (see Table 2). In reality it is unlikely that
all input quantities will be epistemically uncertain, but were made so in this instance to
introduce sufficient complexity to establish viability of uncertainty quantification approaches. In
this situation, it is assumed that blue minus red residual forces is the primary quantity of
interest.
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Table 2: Summary of Uncertain Inputs for Lanchester’s Model of Armed Conflict
Inputs

Uncertainty

X1

Blue Initial Force Size (X0)

[900, 1000]

X2

Red Initial Force Size (Y0)

[400, 500]

X3

Blue Attrition Coefficient (α)

[0.15, 0.25]

X4

Red Attrition Coefficient (β)

[0.3, 0.45]

X5

Blue Stopping Level

[0, 50]

X6

Red Stopping Level

[0, 25]

Bankes (1993) proposes two different modeling paradigms: exploratory vs.
consolidative modeling. Consolidative modeling is the process of building a model by
consolidating known facts into a single package and then using it as a surrogate for the actual
system. In contrast with consolidative modeling, the exploratory modeling approach is the use
of a series of experiments to explore the implications of assumptions when unresolvable
uncertainties preclude building a surrogate for the system. The power of the consolidative
approach lies in the assumption that the performance of the model has been compared to
reality and the accuracy of the model is known to some precision. In situations where this is not
feasible or where important facts about the system under study are uncertain, Bankes (1993)
suggests that the exploratory modeling approach is preferable, and that treating such an
endeavor as if it were a consolidative modeling effort is perilous.
To explore the impact of the proposed uncertainties on blue minus red residual forces,
we employ the exploratory modeling approach as suggested in the literature. A sampling of the
uncertain input distributions are propagated through the Lanchester model using a Monte
Carlo approach with 1,000 runs. However, no distribution for the uncertain inputs was
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provided, so the problem becomes identifying the appropriate distribution to use. Significant
literature references the principle of maximum entropy and that in the absence of another
option, a uniform distribution should be chosen (Bankes, 1993). That convention is adopted
here. Each uncertain input is assumed to be uniformly distributed with endpoints as specified in
the uncertainty interval in Table 2.

3.3.2

Results

A histogram and cumulative distribution function of Blue minus Red residual forces is
provided in Figure 11.

Classical Probability Analysis
90

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

80

Frequency

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Blue Minus Red Residual Forces
Frequency

Cumulative %

Figure 11: Propagation of Uncertainty via Classical Probability Theory
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The Blue minus Red residual forces ranged from 351 to 802 units, with an average value of 633
units. Thus indicating that Blue overwhelmed Red and won the conflict across this sampling of
the uncertain inputs.

3.3.3

Discussion

As an analysis of epistemic uncertainty, there are several ways the preceding analysis
could have been embellished. While with the current uncertainty specification Blue always wins
this conflict, the commander may have an objective value for the Blue minus Red residual
forces that is tactically significant. If a commander was willing and able to specify a threshold
for Blue minus Red for which the strategic objectives for the wider conflict are achieved, then
those values could be reported. A sampling of some notional thresholds and resulting
probability of successfully achieving that objective is provided below (Table 3).

Table 3: Probability of Achieving Blue minus Red Objective
Blue – Red Threshold

Probability of
Meeting Objective

750

0.053

650

0.450

550

0.853

450

0.978

Additionally, there are various statistical intervals that may be of interest. Confidence
intervals on the mean response are a popular way to describe simulation output. Confidence
intervals for the mean Blue minus Red residual forces were computed for confidence levels of
0.99, 0.95 and 0.90 as included in Table 4. While these measures are useful for describing the
52

central tendency of the simulation output, they do a poor job of characterizing the dispersion of
the data (although the confidence intervals do capture some measure of variance).

Table 4: Confidence Intervals on the Mean of Blue minus Red Residual Forces
Confidence Level

Confidence Interval

0.99

[626.53, 639.44]

0.95

[628.07, 637.89]

0.90

[628.86, 637.10]

Additionally, the Blue minus Red residual forces could have been analyzed using ANOVA
or regression techniques. This would have resulted in estimates of the uncertain factors impact
on Blue minus Red residual forces. As this was a random sample, there would likely be
correlation among input factors that may confound the analysis. This could be circumvented by
employment of design of experiments techniques. There are many classes of experimental
designs that would be suitable in aiding analysis of uncertainty, to include factorial and space
filling designs. Employment of these designs would ensure that estimates of factor effects
would not suffer from correlation among inputs.
Any analysis that is executed for this hypothetical combat situation should be completed
in a manner that considers the difficulties in validating the model and the subsequent reliability
in any predictive quantities. A simple presentation of the histogram as the representation of
possible outcomes or confidence intervals on the mean blue minus red residual forces, in this
case, is less than satisfactory. These methods emphasize the absolute quantitative information
instead of the relative comparison, which is contrary to the weakly predictive nature of the

53

model. In this way, an ANOVA (or similar analysis) procedure is preferable as relative factor
effects can be identified and prioritized. Such an approach emphasizes the absolute outcomes
and concentrates on general themes that can be extracted from the data.
Each of the factors in this analysis represents an epistemically uncertain quantity,
meaning that there exists a true value for a given factor but that it is unknown. Since there
exists a true value for this unknown quantity, it is not epistemically correct to model the factors
as random variables or stochastic processes that can be simply described with means and
variances. A more appropriate model for epistemic uncertainty is the range in simulation
output that its possible values can take on (Ferson, 2006).
There are numerous difficulties and inconveniences that are encountered when
analyzing epistemically uncertain quantities impact on simulation output considering both
range and variance. It is this shortcoming that is remedied in the following section.

3.4

Analysis of Epistemic Uncertainty via Evidence Theory
3.4.1

Methodology

Evidence Theory provides a statistical framework for aggregating multiple, potentially
conflicting estimates for a simulation input factor. The uncertainty in the simulation inputs is
then mapped to the simulation output by feeding the input intervals through the model (Figure
12). This process generally requires the formation of basic probability assignments for uncertain
factors, the development of a design matrix to collect data from the simulation, execution of
the simulation runs, estimation of simulation output uncertainty intervals, and, finally, the
computation of cumulative plausibility and belief functions. In this section, the Lanchester
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formulation and uncertainty intervals from Section 3.3 are used as a mechanism to explore
Evidence Theory representation of epistemic uncertainty in blue minus red residual forces.

Figure 12: Method for Propagating Uncertain Inputs through Simulation

Formally, the evidence space for an input is (x, X, mx). Where x is the set of all possible
values for that input, X is the set of subsets of x (Ui’s) that represent the interval estimates for
the input, and mx is the vector of masses associated with each element of X (Ui). The evidence
space for the corresponding simulation output is (y, Y, my). Where y is the set of all possible
values for that output, Y is the set of subsets of y (Ei’s) that represent the interval estimates for
the output, and my is the vector of masses associated with each element of Y (Ei). In the case of
uncertain model inputs, all that is known is X (Ui’s) and Y (Ei’s) is not. The Ei’s are thus properly
considered estimates based on propagation of a corresponding Ui, and identifying the
minimums and maximums produced by that input interval. The mass for a given Ei (my) is
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assigned based on the corresponding Ui. If a given Ui produced an Ei, its mass (mx) becomes the
new mass (my) associated with the new Ei.
In Evidence theory, uncertainty in the inputs is represented with basic probability
assignment functions resulting from the aggregation of multiple inputs. For this demonstration
we assume that three experts were asked “What is the firepower coefficient of the opposing
force in 2055?”. The three plausible responses could be (Figure 13):
•

Expert 1: “It is certainly between 0 and 0.75.”

•

Expert 2: “Hard to say, but most likely between 0.25 and 0.85.”

•

Expert 3: “Based on detailed analysis, I believe it follows this distribution:
{[0.0.25]: 0.2, (0.25, 0.5]: 0.4, (0.5, 0.75]: 0.3, (0.75, 1]: 0.1}”
The word expert implies that these are subjective inputs, but it is worth mentioning that

the “experts” could be outputs of other simulations, estimates derived from distinct
observations, etc. The only requirement is that the individual estimates be independent. In the
author’s experience, this setting is not unrealistic, especially with respect to future operational
scenarios with adversaries whose systems are not completely understood.
Expert 1: {[0, 0.75], 1}

0
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0.5
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1
Expert 2: {[0.25, 0.85], 1}
1
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{[0.5, 0.75], 0.3}
{[0.75, 1.0], 0.1}
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Figure 13: Summary of Expert Input
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For this comparison of uncertainty representation with basic exploratory analysis
procedures and Evidence Theory, all six uncertain factors in the Lanchester model are
represented with the same scaled BPA represented in Figure 12. BPAs were constructed with
both the Dempster and the Mixing rules of combination to illustrate differences between
conjunctive and disjunctive combination rules. The final design matrix and estimation of Ei’s
were generated using inputs from the BPA formed with the Mixing rule of combination.
There is a direct link between constructing the design matrix for the simulation effort
and how the analyst intends to estimate yi’s and Ei’s. To estimate the Ei’s, the maximum and
minimum simulation outputs must be estimated for each intersection of the Ui’s across each
factor. For this six factor experiment with six Ui’s for each factor, the resulting experimental
design contains 6^6 (or 46,656) interval intersections for which the maximum and minimum
simulation response must be estimated. Two possible approaches to estimating the yi’s and Ei’s
would be to use a meta-model or enumerating a large number of possibilities explicitly with the
simulation. Neither approach guarantees that the global maximum or minimums have been
found, which is why these quantities are frequently referred to as estimates for E.
In either case, the analyst must choose a sampling procedure. The literature contains
many examples of the sampling based approached, including random sampling, factorial
experiments, and space filling designed experiments (Ankenman, 2012; Kleijnen, 2006).
However, if a meta-model is to be used, care should be taken to ensure that the resulting
model is statistically valid. To avoid this difficulty and to demonstrate the concept of Evidence
Theory as a viable method for uncertainty representation in combat modeling, an enumeration
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approach was selected. The Ei’s were estimated by taking the maximum and minimum from
running the factorial combination of the endpoints of the Ui’s resulting in 6^6*2^6 (2,985,984)
simulation runs. Finally, the cumulative plausibility and belief functions (CPF and CBF
respectively) were computed using equations (30) and (31).

3.4.2

Results

The expert input provided in Figure 3 was aggregated per the Dempster’s Rule of
Combination and the Mixing Rule of Combination as in equations (32) and (35). The resulting
BPA, Cumulative Plausibility Function, and the Cumulative Belief Functions are shown in Figure
14 and Figure 15. Figure 16 is the plot of the Cumulative Belief and Plausibility functions
resulting from propagating the uncertain inputs through the Lanchester model of conflict
supposed in section 3.4.1.
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Figure 14: BPA Constructed with Dempster’s Rule of Combination
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BPA Constructed with Mixing Rule of Combination
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Figure 15: BPA Constructed with Mixing Rule of Combination
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Figure 16: Evidence Theory Representation of Combat Model Uncertainty
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3.4.3

Discussion

Upon comparison of the outputs from the traditional probabilistic uncertainly analysis
outlined in Section 3.3 and the analysis of epistemic uncertainty with Evidence Theory, there
are several noteworthy differences. The first significant difference is the manner in which the
inputs for the simulation were collected. In the probabilistic analysis, the inputs were
aggregated in a way that resulted in a single range for each uncertain factor, which
encompassed the widest possible set of values from subject matter experts. This approach
discards information about where the expert’s opinions overlapped. This overlap in inputs is
leveraged in Evidence Theory, by using a combination operator to create a probability
assignment distribution for the factor. Using this process there is no need for the analyst to
make judgments about the quality or validity of an individual estimate, and all relevant inputs
can be aggregated in a transparent manner. For this demonstration, the hypothetical subject
matter expert input was aggregated using both Dempster’s and the mixing rules of combination
(see Figure 17).

60

Probability Mass

Comparison of Dempster's and Mixing Rules of
Combination
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Simulation Factor
Mixing CBF

Mixing CPF

Dempster's CBF

Dempster's CPF

Figure 17: Comparison of Dempster’s and the Mixing Rules of Combination

Dempster’s rule of combination is a conjunctive operator and, as expected, truncated
the range of the expert input to the space over which the factor estimates overlapped. In
contrast, the mixing rule of combination is a disjunctive operator and preserved the full range
of expert input. While one of the benefits of an Evidence Theory representation of uncertainty
in combat modeling is the repeatable and transparent method for consolidating multiple,
conflicting sources, the relative weight of each source could be adjusted. These adjustments
result in different BPA’s for the factors. Figure 18 plots the CBF and CPF for three different
combinations of weights (w from 3.2.2) for the three expert inputs used, where each wi is the
reliability associated with the ith source (and wi’s sum to one).
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Figure 18: BPAs for Various Relative Weights across Expert Inputs

Another key difference between the probabilistic and Evidence Theory representations
of uncertainty is the presentation and interpretation of summary statistics. The output of the
Evidence Theory analysis is a set of two functions; the CBF and CPF, compared to the single
output for the probabilistic analysis (see Figure 19).

62

Probability

Comparison of Probabalistic and Evidence Theory
Representations of Uncertainty
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Blue Minus Red Residual Forces
Cum. Plausibility

Cum. Belief

CDF

Figure 19: Comparison of Probabilistic and Evidence Theory Representations of Uncertainty

As described in the literature, the CPF and CBF are bounds on the CDF from the
probabilistic analysis. In a similar manner to the analysis in Section 3.3, key summary statistics
can be extracted from the probability plots except that the outputs are ranges instead of single
values. For example, the mean (50th percentile) in the Evidence Theory representation is
reported as the range [477, 874]. This corresponds to the 50th percentile value from the CPF
and CBF respectively. Table 5 contains a report of various other percentiles of interest.
Reporting of summary statistics as ranges provides a direct representation of uncertainties in
model inputs to consumers of this analysis of the impact of uncertainties on simulation output,
mitigating the propensity to interpret simulation output as absolute.
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Table 5: Plausibility and Belief Percentiles
Percentile Level

Range

95th

[617, 944]

75th

[551, 908]

50th

[477, 874]

25th

[422, 838]

5th

[351, 765]

Additionally, there is an Evidence Theory analog to the analysis in section 3.3.3. If a
commander was willing and able to specify a threshold for Blue minus Red for which the
strategic objectives for the wider conflict are achieved, then the range of probabilities
associated with that threshold could be identified. A sampling of some notional thresholds and
resulting probability of successfully achieving that objective is provided below for both the
baseline and Evidence Theory based analysis of uncertainty (Table 6). The baseline and
Evidence Theory representations of the probability of meeting the commander’s thresholds for
success are very different. First, the resulting probabilities from the Evidence Theory analysis
are ranges. In some cases these ranges are quite large, 0.95 and 0.97 for the 750 and 650 Blue
minus Red thresholds respectively. In all cases the Evidence Theory ranges encompass the
probabilities provided by the baseline analysis.
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Table 6: Probability of Achieving Blue minus Red Objective
Blue – Red Threshold

Probability of
Meeting Objective Baseline

750

0.053

650

0.450

550

0.853

450

0.978

Probability of Meeting
Objective – Evidence
Theory
[0.01, 0.96]
[0.02, 0.99]
[0.25, 1]
[0.64, 1]

It is likely the commander’s reaction to each analysis would be entirely different,
depending on which analysis they were presented. Suppose the commander believes that
having a Blue minus Red residual force of 650 units is strategically significant and is presented
with the baseline analysis which indicates that the probability of achieving success is 0.45.
Seeing that this is roughly a coin flip (and that his troops are confident they can win), he may
proceed with the planned battle.
Now suppose the same commander is presented with the Evidence Theory analysis
which indicates the probability of achieving success is between 0.02 and 0.99. One response
could be that they take the average of the range and proceed as in the baseline analysis.
Alternatively, the commander may pause and arrive at the conclusion that his analysts don’t
have enough information to distinguish between near certainty (0.99) that they will achieve
their objectives or near certainty that they will fail (0.02). At this point, the commander may
either develop another plan that is not sensitive to a Blue minus Red threshold of 650 in this
battle or gather more information that can be used to reduce the uncertainty in the ability of
their forces to achieve the objective.
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Using this framework does not address the complicating factors which prevent model
validation in a combat analysis and the subsequent limits in quantified predictive capability.
Representation of uncertainties inherent to combat modeling using Evidence Theory improves
representation of uncertainty by providing ranges instead of point values for metric output.
Using this framework should reduce the propensity to overlook these shortcomings when
reviewing analysis output and inspire a more thoughtful dialog on the causes of the range in
possible outcomes observed during the study.
A direct analog for the ANOVA analysis discussed in Section 3.3 has been developed in
Helton (2006) and Guo (2007). This work and an extension are detailed in Chapter IV.

3.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, Evidence Theory was demonstrated as a framework for representing

epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling output. The steps for aggregating multiple,
conflicting sources for simulation input data were demonstrated. A basic probability assignment
was assumed for six uncertain factors; initial force size, attrition coefficient and stopping level
for both Blue and Red forces in a Lanchester model of conflict. The analysis found that the
proposed uncertainty configuration induced a large gap between the cumulative plausibility
and belief functions for Blue minus Red residual forces, indicating large uncertainty in combat
outcomes (although Blue always won!). To provide context for the Evidence Theory analysis, a
traditional approach was employed in assessment of uncertainty of Blue minus Red residual
forces in a Lanchester model of conflict. The results of both analyses were compared and
contrasted.
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The demonstration of Evidence Theory as a framework for representing outcomes in
combat modeling and simulation addresses several key gaps in the literature and common
practice. First, is the propensity to treat combat simulation output as predictive when, upon
examining what is known and unknown regarding the model inputs, it clearly is not. This is
addressed by supplementing the single output probability density functions with cumulative
belief and plausibility functions from evidence theory. These functions represent bounds on
probability densities given an input uncertainty specification (or basic probability assignment).
Common summary statistics (i.e. mean, probability intervals, etc.) are in the form of ranges,
which discourage the propensity to treat point estimates from a simulation as predictive.
Second, is that the employment of the Evidence Theory rules of combination eliminates
the need to make choices about how to use multiple, potentially conflicting sources for
modeling and simulation inputs. In the presence of multiple inputs, traditional approaches
typically follow one of two lines of thought: 1) condense the sources into a single point
estimate or 2) employ the Laplace principle of maximum entropy and assume a uniform
distribution over the range of possible values. The validity of these approaches is heavily
influenced by the process by which the sources are condensed to either a point estimate or
range. In practice, these methods are unstructured and not well documented. In contrast,
Evidence Theory provides a structure for aggregating multiple, conflicting sources in a
repeatable manner without making assumptions regarding the distribution of the true value of
the input.
Implementing these methods does not come without cost. Managing multiple sources
and choosing the appropriate Evidence Theory rule of combination add additional complexity
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to the overall analysis. The need to estimate the maximum and minimum response in each
input’s basic probability assignment interval intersections can drive significant increases in the
number of required simulation runs. Large run matrices can be mitigated through the
employment of design of experiments and meta-modeling. These costs are offset by the clarity
provided to the decision maker regarding how uncertainties in modeling and simulation inputs
affect the analysis outcomes.
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IV.

4.1

Sensitivity Analysis of Uncertainty in Combat Modeling

Introduction
Due to the infrequent and competitive nature of combat, several challenges present

themselves when using simulation as a tool for analyzing combat. First, there is limited data
with which to validate such analysis tools. While it may be possible to validate individual pieces
of a combat simulation, such as the performance of a specific radar on a specific platform, to
assess the integration of all mission aspects against current and future threats is a much more
significant effort. Attempts have been made to validate combat models, in aggregate, with
historical data (Schramm, 2012), but this is of little value as the models themselves require
heavy modification to incorporate modern or future forces, requiring their own distinct
validation. Secondly, there are many aspects of combat modeling that are highly uncertain and
not knowable (an unresolvable uncertainty (Bankes, 1993)), such as the exact tactics,
techniques and procedures of an adversary force in response to a blue force strike.
Within the combat modeling community there have been several suggestions for exploring
uncertainties associated with the domain (Bankes, 1993; Davis, 2000; Dewar, 1996). However,
the output of these approaches does not clearly communicate the uncertainties that are buried
within the inputs. In Chapter III, Evidence Theory was demonstrated as a framework for
representing epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling output. The steps for aggregating
multiple, conflicting sources for simulation input data were demonstrated with a simple
Lanchester model incorporating six uncertain factors. The analysis found that the proposed
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uncertainty configuration induced a large gap between the cumulative plausibility and belief
functions for Blue minus Red residual forces, indicating large uncertainty in combat outcomes.
This framework addresses several key gaps in the combat modeling and simulation
literature and common practice. First, is the propensity to treat combat simulation output as
predictive when it is not. This is addressed by representing simulation output with cumulative
belief and plausibility functions from evidence theory, instead of the classical single probability
density function. These functions represent bounds on probability densities given an input
uncertainty specification. Common summary statistics (i.e. mean, probability intervals, etc.) are
in the form of ranges, which discourages the tendency to treat point estimates from a
simulation as predictive.
Second, is that the employment of Evidence Theory rules of combination eliminates the
need to make choices about how to reconcile multiple, potentially conflicting sources for
modeling and simulation inputs. In the presence of multiple inputs, traditional approaches
typically follow one of two lines of thought: 1) condense the sources into a single point
estimate or 2) employ the Laplace principle of maximum entropy and assume a uniform
distribution over the range of possible values expressed by the experts. The validity of these
approaches is heavily influenced by the process by which the sources are condensed to either a
point estimate or range. In practice, these methods are unstructured and not well documented.
In contrast, Evidence Theory provides a structure for aggregating multiple, conflicting sources in
a repeatable manner without making assumptions regarding the distribution of the true value
of the input.
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Use of Evidence Theory as an analytical framework does not directly address the
complicating factors which prevent model validation in a combat analysis and the subsequent
limits in quantified predictive capability. Literature addressing this topic has suggested the
adoption of exploratory approaches, where inputs are structured as a designed experiment or
monte carlo sample. This sample is then internally analyzed to identify significant factors
through statistical techniques like regression, ANOVA, etc. Exploratory activities produce
prioritized contributors to simulation output, and deemphasize the magnitude of the simulation
output variables.
The objective of this research is to extend the recent work in representation of uncertainty
in combat modeling and simulation, by developing a sensitivity analysis method for identifying
the factors which contribute to the overall uncertainty in simulation output. Existing
approaches to this problem implement a variance based metric for factor prioritization (Helton,
2006), which requires a second analysis, or is susceptible to ties when large uncertainties are
present (Guo, 2007). In a resource constrained environment, such methods would facilitate
prioritization of resources with the goal of reducing uncertainty in system performance.
This chapter is organized into five major sections: Introduction, Background, Methodology,
Results and Discussion, and Conclusion. The Introduction provides a general overview of the
context for the research in sensitivity analysis of belief functions in Evidence Theory. This
section includes a brief introduction and analysis of issues in the literature and a synopsis of
research contributions. The Background section provides a summary of sensitivity analysis in
modeling and simulation, sensitivity analysis of belief functions in Evidence Theory, and
measures of distance in Evidence Theory. A novel approach to identifying and quantifying the
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impact of input uncertainty on total system output uncertainty is presented in the
Methodology section. This method is demonstrated using a Lanchester model of conflict. The
results of this analysis and a discussion of interesting features from this application is provided
in the Results and Discussion section. In the Conclusions section, a summary of the research
context, contributions, and future work are identified.

4.2

Background
4.2.1

Sensitivity Analysis of Belief and Plausibility

There has been some suggestion that analysis using Evidence Theory is sensitivity
analysis (Ferson, 2006). In the sense that analysis with Evidence Theory identifies bounds on
true outcome probabilities, this is reasonable. However, often what is meant in the modeling
and simulation community by sensitivity analysis is a process that produces the relative,
absolute or rank ordered effects for a set of variables on a measurable parameter. This type of
product is not the direct result of propagating basic probability assignments (BPAs) of uncertain
factors through a simulation and producing the cumulative plausibility function (CPF) and
cumulative belief function (CBF) of an important measure of system performance. A specific set
of techniques are required to translate the ideas of sensitivity analysis in classical probability
theory to the framework of Evidence Theory.
In classical probability theory, important variables explain the largest portion of the
variation in system output. In contrast, variables that are important in explaining uncertainty in
Evidence Theory have the largest effect in reducing the area between the CBF and CPF. Several
attempts to produce rank ordering of variables explaining uncertainty in Evidence Theory have
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been documented in the literature with two specific approaches summarized in the subsequent
paragraphs.
Helton (2006) presented a first of its kind paper outlining three methodologies for
sensitivity analysis in conjunction with Evidence Theory representations of uncertainty. The first
method generically entailed using a stratified sampling procedure to generate data which could
then be fit with a statistical modeling technique to identify the most critical factors x on
outcome y. Latin Hypercube or random sampling were suggested as viable sampling
procedures, while rank regression and squared rank differences were provided as suitable
statistical modeling techniques. Where this method differs from most classic design of
experiments and simulation efforts is that the sample is weighted by the respective factors’
BPAs. They called this procedure exploratory sensitivity analysis.
Additionally, a stepwise procedure for construction of CBFs and CPFs was presented.
The intent of this method was to enable epistemically uncertain variables to be added one-at-atime until the CPFs’ and CBFs’ rate of change slowed to within an acceptable range, saving
computation time. The methodology is as follows (Helton, 2006):
•

Step 0: Perform Exploratory sensitivity analysis to determine the most
important factors, 𝑥𝑥�1, …, 𝑥𝑥�n, on the uncertainty in output, y. Where 𝑥𝑥�1 is
the most important variable, 𝑥𝑥�2 is the next most important variable, etc.
and n is the number of variables or factors.

•

Step 1: Estimate a CPF and a CBF for y on the basis of the evidence space
obtained from the original evidence space for the 𝑥𝑥�1 and degenerate
evidence spaces for all other variables (in which the sample spaces are
assigned BPAs of 1).

•

Step 2: Estimate a CPF and a CBF for y on the basis of the evidence space
obtained from the original evidence space for the 𝑥𝑥�1 and the 𝑥𝑥�2 and
degenerate evidence spaces for all other variables (in which the sample
spaces are assigned BPAs of 1).
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•

Step s: Estimate a CPF and a CBF for y on the basis of the evidence space
obtained from the original evidence space for 𝑥𝑥�1, …, 𝑥𝑥�s and degenerate
evidence spaces for all other variables (in which the sample spaces are
assigned BPAs of 1).

•

Termination: End when no significant difference between the CBFs-1 and
CPFs-1 obtained at Step s-1 and CBFs and CPFs obtained at Step s.

This method relies on the fact that as epistemically uncertain variables are added to the
computation of the CBF and CPF, the bounds they represent can only stay the same or
decrease.
The final sensitivity analysis method proposed by Helton (2006) was called the summary
sensitivity analysis procedure. This method decomposes the variance of outcome y into
contributions by the individual xi’s variances. As there are many possible distributions for each
xi that are consistent with its evidence space, a sampling of assumed distributions for each xi
must be explored as part of this method. This results in not one prioritized list of sensitivities,
but a set of prioritized lists. This method was demonstrated on failure probabilities of a set of
actuators. For this analysis a number of different distribution assumptions were made, and the
resulting decomposition was found to be invariant to choice of distributions. As this is an
empirical result, there are no guarantees that this holds in general.
Guo and Du (2007) developed a one-at-a-time approach to quantify the effect of each
individual variable on the uncertainty in their system response. Their method produces a series
of CBFs and CPFs, where each one is generated by fixing all but one variable to an average,
weighted by the factors’ BPA and leaving the remaining as an epistemically uncertain variable
with corresponding BPA. The distance between the CBF and CPF for a given variable, as
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calculated by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K-S) statistic, is then used to prioritize the relative
importance of individual variables. This method was demonstrated on two example problems
from engineering mechanics; the crank-slider mechanism and a crowned cam roller/follower’s
contact.
The K-S distance is the maximum difference between two CDFs (Banks, 2010), or in the
context of the sensitivity analysis procedure described by Guo (2007), the difference between
the CPF and CBF. This is an admirable choice in that the prioritization metric does not rely on a
variance based metric (where Evidence Theory is primarily concerned with ranges) as in Helton
(2006). However, in situations where there is high uncertainty and subsequently large
differences between CPFs and CBFs, discriminating among the important factors may prove
difficult.
Figure 20 represents a set of plausible CBFs and CBFs for six epistemically uncertain
factors x on outcome y. In this configuration, significant uncertainty exists where there is a large
range where the value of each CPF is 1 and the value of each CBF is 0, resulting in a K-S distance
of 1 for all factors (highlighted by the red arrow in Figure 20). Referring back to the original
notion of sensitivity analysis in Evidence Theory being interested with factors that minimize the
area between the CPF and CBF being the most important, it is clear that variables X5 and X6 are
not in that category. Their CBFs and CPFs are outside the bounds of all other variables, yet the
K-S distance does not identify that feature.
It is not entirely clear how many runs are required to run the analysis proposed by Guo
(2007). The authors reference 2n+1 as the number of iterations of uncertainty analysis
required, but do not specify how many runs are required to execute each iteration. Per their
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own admission, this approach is expected to be computationally intensive and potentially
inefficient as each uncertain variable is varied one-at-a-time. In contrast, the stepwise
construction of CBFs and CPFs proposed by Helton (2006) does not require any additional
simulation runs when epistemically uncertain factors are varied together.
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Figure 20: Ties using K-S Distance when Large Uncertainties Exist

4.2.2 Measures of Distance in Evidence Theory
Measures of distance or similarity have been developed and employed in many areas of
statistical analysis, including object classification, statistical comparison of distributions, etc.
Their primary goal is to provide a measure for how different two points, vectors or bodies of
evidence are. They are usually constructed such that small distances indicate the two points or
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objects are “close” or “similar”, while large distances mean the two are “far apart” or
“dissimilar”.
The formal definition of a distance metric is a measure that satisfies the four properties
listed in Table 7; Non-negativity, Symmetry, Definiteness (grouped with Reflexivity and
Separability) and the Triangle Inequality. The non-negativity property states that the distance
between two points, in the space where the measure is defined, is always greater than or equal
to zero. A distance metric must also produce the same value, regardless of the direction the
distance is calculated. This is the symmetry property. The definiteness property states that the
distance between two identical points is zero (reflexivity) and that when the distance is zero,
the two points must have been identical (separability). Finally, the triangle inequality is the
property that the distance between two points is less than or equal to the sum of the distances
between each of these points and a third point.
Not all measures used in Evidence Theory satisfy all four properties. As previously
stated, a true distance metric satisfies all four properties listed in Table 7. Semi-metrics satisfy
all properties except the triangle inequality. Quasi-metrics are not symmetric. Pseudo-metrics
are not separable, and thus not definite. Quasi-pseudo metrics only satisfy the symmetric and
reflexive properties, while pre-metrics only satisfy the reflexive property. A non-metric (not
show in Table 7), is a measure which does not satisfy any of the four properties.
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Table 7: Axioms for metrics (adapted from Jousselme, (2012))

(i) Non-negativity

d(y, z) ≥ 0

X

SemiMetric
X

(ii) Symmetry

d(y, z) = d(z, y)

X

X

(iii) Definiteness

d(y, z) = 0 ↔ y = z

X

X

X

d(y, y) = 0

X

X

X

d(y, z) = 0 → y = z

X

X

X

Metric

(iii)’ Reflexivity
(iii)’’ Separability
(iv) Triangle Inequal.

d(y, z) ≤ d(y, t) + d(t, z)

X

QuasiMetric
X

X

Pseudo
-Metric
X

Quasi-Pseudo
Metric
X

X

X

X

X

PreMetric
X

X

X

Applications of distance metrics in Evidence Theory are largely centered on finding
approximations to belief functions, quickly and automatically (Han, 2018). Large numbers of
estimates for a parameter value can produce BPAs which contain many foci. Propagating these
foci through a model can be time consuming, even with a small (6 or less) number of estimates.
The goal of this body of work is to reduce the number of elements in a belief function while
maintaining the general integrity of the true function.
There are a large number of distance metrics available for use in analysis with Evidence
Theory. Jousselme (2012) provides a survey of many distance measures in Evidence Theory,
their properties, and relative family from which they are derived. The Minkowski family is a
series of distances which includes the evidence theory analogs to the Manhattan, Euclidean and
Chebyshev distances. Another way to measure the difference between two belief functions is
to estimate the difference in their information content. This family contains the Evidence
Theory equivalent to the Kullback-Liebler divergence from classical probability theory.
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Additional families of distance measures in Evidence Theory include inner products, cosine
measures, and the fidelity family of metrics.

4.3

Methodology
4.3.1 Wasserstein Distance as a Metric for Sensitivity Analysis of Uncertainty
There are two key features in a procedure for sensitivity analysis in Evidence Theory; the

stepwise construction of CPFs and CBFs and the construction of a metric with which to compare
the contributions of the variables in explaining the uncertainty in outcomes. The following
section develops the second feature, with a comprehensive methodology produced in section
4.3.2.
The intuitive notion behind sensitivity analysis in Evidence Theory is to identify which
variables reduce the area between the CPF and CBF and by how much (Ferson, 2006). This
concept is more intuitive when compared against the concept of least information, or where all
the BPAs are degenerate in Evidence Theory. When all BPAs are degenerate, the CPF and CBF
will appear as the plot in Figure 21, where a is the minimum of the data and b is the maximum.

1

Probability

0.8
0.6

CPF

0.4

CBF

0.2
0

a

b

Figure 21: Concept of “Maximum Uncertainty”
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From the proof in Helton (2006), as more variables with non-degenerate BPAs are added to the
estimate of the CPF and CBF, the area between the two functions will always decrease.
In classical probability theory, the area between two cumulative density functions is
known as the Wasserstein metric (Rüschendorf, 2001),

𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝 (𝜇𝜇, 𝑣𝑣) ≔

1/𝑃𝑃
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�∫𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)�
𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(𝜇𝜇, 𝑣𝑣)

(36)

where (M, d) is a metric space and for p ≥ 1, Pp(M) is the collection of all measures µ, v on M
with finite pth moment. This measure is also known as the Kantorovich or Earth Movers distance
in the computer science community.
In our setting, we can greatly simplify this expression for the 1 dimensional case,
resulting in the following expression (Rüschendorf, 2001):

∞

𝑊𝑊1 (𝜇𝜇, 𝑣𝑣) = ∫−∞�𝐹𝐹𝜇𝜇 (𝑥𝑥) − 𝐺𝐺𝑣𝑣 (𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.

(37)

This measure satisfies the requirements for non-negativity, symmetry, definiteness, and
triangle inequality, qualifying it as a true metric in the framework presented in 4.2.2. Also,
assuming the body of evidence results in BPAs that meet the criteria for probability density
functions, the Evidence Theory and classical probability theory representation of this metric are
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equivalent. In Evidence Theory 𝐹𝐹𝜇𝜇 and 𝐺𝐺𝑣𝑣 represent the CBF and CPF, respectively, for a given
variable.

4.3.2

Method for Prioritizing Variables Impact on Uncertainty

This method for sensitivity analysis in Evidence Theory is motivated by prior work
developing a stepwise procedure to generate marginal CBF and CPFs and the use of statistical
differences to develop a ranking of the variables impact on uncertainty. It is intended that this
methodology follows an analysis executed according to the procedures discussed in Chapter III.
These procedures detail the process to aggregating multiple inputs, propagating them through
a model or simulation, and generating the CPF and CBF of the resulting measure of interest.
Once the data is generated, the methodology is as follows:
1. Let 𝛷𝛷 = {1, … , 𝑛𝑛} be the set of all variable indices under consideration for this
analysis (where n is the number of variables) and 𝛺𝛺 = { }.
2. Iteration k: for each variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝛷𝛷;

a. Estimate a CPF and a CBF for y on the basis of the evidence space obtained from
the original evidence space for the xi, the original evidence space(s) for any
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , ∀𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝛺𝛺, and degenerate evidence spaces for all other variables (in which the
sample spaces are assigned BPAs of 1).
b. Calculate 𝑊𝑊1𝑖𝑖 between the marginal CPF and CBF for variable i.

3. Select variable 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝛷𝛷, that minimizes 𝑊𝑊1. . Remove s from set 𝛷𝛷 and add to set 𝛺𝛺.
�1𝑘𝑘 = 𝑊𝑊1𝑠𝑠 .
Let 𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘 = 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 , where 𝑥𝑥� is an ordering of x and 𝑊𝑊

4. Increment k and repeat steps (2) and (3) until 𝛷𝛷 = { }.

81

This method is notable in several respects. First, it employs the stepwise construction of
CBFs and CBFs as descried in Helton (2006) and a statistical measure of distance as in Guo
(2007). Guo (2007) employs the K-S distance which has been demonstrated to be susceptible to
ties when there are large uncertainties in outcomes with respect to the variables. The
Wasserstein distance, however, is not likely to cause ties in the procedure except when the
variables under analysis have very little relationship to the uncertainty in model outcomes,
where they exhibit marginal CPFs and CBFs similar to Figure 21.
A significant difference between the method proposed by Helton (2006) and the one
presented here, is that no preliminary exploratory sensitivity analysis procedure is required.
Such a procedure is good practice, but not integrally linked in the new method. A modification
of this procedure could be produced where it is used (as in Helton (2006)) to incrementally
construct estimates of CBFs and CPFs by adding variables until the functions stop changing
enough to warrant further computation.

4.3.3 Methodology Demonstration
To demonstrate the methods from sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, a hypothetical military
conflict modeled by Lanchester’s Square Law with stopping level (a force level for both red and
blue where the conflict will end) for both red and blue forces is analyzed. For this model there
are 6 key inputs; initial force levels (blue – X1, red – X2), attrition coefficients (blue – X3, red –
X4), and stopping level for both blue (X5) and red (X6) sides. These inputs are presumed to be
epistemically uncertain and that the analyst has been given ranges for each input. In this
situation, it is assumed that blue minus red residual forces is the primary quantity of interest.
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All six uncertain factors in the Lanchester model are represented with the same scaled BPA
represented in Figure 22. The factor BPAs were formed using the Mixing Rule of combination.
The final simulation run matrix was constructed to support an enumeration approach for
calculating the interval estimates of the output. This overall experimental setup is exactly the
same as described in Chapter III. As such; a more detailed explanation of the Lanchester model
used can be found in sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.1 and more details regarding the construction of
the BPAs and design matrix for this demonstration can be found in section 3.4.1. Once the
simulation runs were complete, the marginal sensitivity of the model factors and overall
contribution to the belief and plausibility functions were computed as described in sections
4.3.1 and 4.3.2

BPA Constructed with Mixing Rule of Combination
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Figure 22: Notional BPA for Representing Uncertain Factors
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1

4.4

Results and Discussion
The methodology and application were performed as described in section 4.3. The first

iteration of the method resulted in six distinct sets of cumulative plausibility and belief
functions (CBFs and CPFs), one for each epistemically uncertain variable in the model (Figure
23). Upon inspection, it appears that variables five and six explain the least amount of
uncertainty. It is difficult to explain (by inspection) which variables explain the most
uncertainty, as there is no pair of CBFs and CPFs that dominate all other sets. To clarify which
variable explains the most uncertainty, the Wasserstein distance between the marginal CBFs
and CPFs were computed for each variable in Table 8. These scores ranged from 810.13 to
672.53, with X5 (blue stopping level) explaining the least uncertainty and X4 (red attrition
coefficient) explaining the most. To conclude step one, X4 was selected as the first variable to
enter the basis for the estimates of the CBF and CPF.
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Figure 23: Sensitivity Analysis of Blue minus Red Residual Forces – Step 1

Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis – Step 1
Summary of Wasserstein Distance
Step 1
Initial Blue Forces (X1)
714
Initial Red Forces (X2)
683
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3)
685
Red Firepower Coefficient (X4)
673
Blue Stopping Level (X5)
810
Red Stopping Level (X6)
793
In step 2, five sets of CPFs and CBFs were produced. Each was a combination of X4 and
the remaining variables non degenerate BPAs (Figure 24). Again, visual inspection reveals no
obvious choice for explaining the most uncertainty, while combinations containing X5 and X6
appear to explain the least, as in step 1. The Wasserstein distances between the marginal CBFs
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and CPFs were computed for each variable (Table 9). These scores ranged from 672.53 to
570.37, with X5 (blue stopping level) explaining the least uncertainty and X3 (blue attrition
coefficient) explaining the most. To conclude step two, X3 was selected as the next variable to
enter the basis for the estimates of the CBF and CPF.
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Figure 24: Sensitivity Analysis of Blue minus Red Residual Forces – Step 2

Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis – Step 2
Summary of Wasserstein Distance
Step 2
Initial Blue Forces (X1)
597
Initial Red Forces (X2)
574
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3)
570
Red Firepower Coefficient (X4)
Blue Stopping Level (X5)
673
Red Stopping Level (X6)
661
86
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The same procedure produced equivalent plots and Wasserstein distances for steps 3
through 6. At the conclusion of each step, the variable which had the smallest Wasserstein
distance between their marginal CPFs and CBFs was added to the basis for the overall CPF and
CBF. See Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27, and Figure 28 for plots of the marginal CPF and CBFs.
Table 10 provides a summary of the Wasserstein distances at each step of the sensitivity
analysis. The ordered importance of the variables on total uncertainty was red attrition
coefficient (X4), blue attrition coefficient (X3), red initial force level (X2), blue initial force level
(X1), red stopping level (X6) and blue stopping level (X5).

Table 10: Sensitivity Analysis Summary
Summary of Wasserstein Distance
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Initial Blue Forces (X1)
714
597
499
401
Initial Red Forces (X2)
683
574
476
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3)
685
570
Red Firepower Coefficient (X4)
673
Blue Stopping Level (X5)
810
673
570
476
Red Stopping Level (X6)
793
661
560
458
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Step 5
401
386

Step 6
386
-
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Figure 25: Sensitivity Analysis of Blue minus Red Residual Forces – Step 3
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Figure 26: Sensitivity Analysis of Blue minus Red Residual Forces – Step 4
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Figure 27: Sensitivity Analysis of Blue minus Red Residual Forces – Step 5
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Figure 28: Sensitivity Analysis of Blue minus Red Residual Forces – Step 6
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A number of model specific and method specific findings were identified as a result of
this analysis. First, the Lanchester Model parameters were ordered in their explanation of total
uncertainty. The Lanchester Model utilized in this demonstration had three key parameters to
describe both the red and blue forces; initial force level, attrition coefficient and stopping level.
In this analysis both attrition coefficients (red then blue) were the first variables added to the
model, then initial force size, then stopping level. It is also interesting to note that the red
variables were always first to enter the basis for the CPFs and CBFs. There is no particular
explanation for this, except that it may be due to the specific uncertainty ranges used for this
study. Other ranges may produce different results.
Second, the variable X5 does not explain any uncertainty associated with the output of
our model with respect to the range of inputs analyzed. The resulting marginal CPF and CBF
selected in step 5 is the same as the final, full CPF and CBF. This could have been evident at the
first step when it was observed that the marginal CPF and CBF resulted in no change in
explained uncertainty, i.e. maximum uncertainty (see Figure 21).
The CPFs and CBFs at the end of each step are either equal to or contained within the
bounds of prior steps’ CPFs and CBFs (see Figure 29). This is consistent with the result in Helton
(2006), where the Wasserstein distance between two CPFs and CBFs and can only decrease or
remain the same when adding variables. Also, the ordering of the Wasserstein distances among
the variables at a given step is not necessarily preserved across steps. For example, in step 1 the
marginal CPF and CBF with the second smallest Wasserstein distance was X2 (red initial force
level). But the variable with the smallest Wasserstein distance in step 2 was variable X3 (blue
90

attrition coefficient), not X2. The number of foci increased with each step, resulting in smoother
marginal CPFs and CBFs. Assigning degenerate BPAs for all factors but one in step 1, resulted in
CPFs and CBFs with at most 6 foci (or steps), step 2 produced CPFs and CBFs with at most 62,
step 3; 63, etc.
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Figure 29: Sensitivity Analysis of Blue minus Red Residual Forces – Summary

4.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, a new method for sensitivity analysis of uncertainty in Evidence Theory

was developed. This sensitivity analysis method generates marginal CPFs and CBFs and
prioritizes the contribution of each factor by the Wasserstein distance (also known as the
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Kantorovich or Earth Mover’s distance) of the CBF and CPF. Using this method, a rank ordering
of the simulation input factors can be produced.
This method is notable in several respects. First, it combines positive elements from the
Evidence Theory literature; the stepwise construction of CBFs and CBFs and a statistical
measure of distance. The new method improves on existing work that employs the K-S
distance, which has been demonstrated to be susceptible to ties when there are large
uncertainties in outcomes with respect to the variables. The Wasserstein distance, however is
not likely to cause ties in the procedure except when the variables under analysis have very
little relationship to the uncertainty in model outcomes, where they exhibit a large difference
between marginal CPFs and CBFs.
A significant difference between the method proposed in Helton (2006) and the one
presented here, is that no preliminary exploratory sensitivity analysis procedure is required.
Such a procedure is good practice, but not integrally linked in the new method. A modification
of this procedure could be produced where it is used to incrementally construct estimates of
CBFs and CPFs by adding variables until the functions stop changing enough to warrant further
computation.
The method was demonstrated on a notional Lanchester model of conflict with six
epistemically uncertain parameters. A relative prioritization of the factors was produced, where
five of six factors had distinct contributions in explaining total uncertainty while a sixth did not.
The ordered importance of the variables on total uncertainty was red attrition coefficient, blue
attrition coefficient, red initial force level, blue initial force level, red stopping level and blue
stopping level. While the specific results of this analysis are not extensible, they are a useful
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example for how to apply sensitivity analysis with Evidence Theory in modeling, simulation and
analysis activities.
The costs of employing this method are similar to those of generally employing Evidence
Theory in analysis. Additional complexity to the overall analysis is induced via management of
multiple input sources and choosing the appropriate Evidence Theory rule of combination to
summarize the body of evidence. The need to recalculate CBFs and CBFs adds computation
time, which is not insignificant for large numbers of uncertain variables with complex BPAs.
These costs are offset by the clarity provided to the decision maker regarding the sensitivity of
analysis outcome uncertainties to uncertain inputs.
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V.

5.1

Error Estimation via Multi-Model Methods for Analysis of Combat

Introduction
Models of combat have been employed by systems and operations research analysts

since the 1960’s for exploring possible outcomes of hypothetical military conflict (Davis, 1995).
The fidelity of these models has ranged from simple mathematical relationships describing
attrition between two opposing forces (Lanchester, 1914) to high fidelity operator or hardware
in the loop simulations for exploration of detailed system configuration changes (Haase, 2014).
Over time the employment of combat simulations has expanded within the DoD to support
processes including, operations planning, requirements analysis, operational test, and training.
Due to the infrequent and competitive nature of combat, several challenges present
themselves when using simulation as a tool for analyzing combat. First, there are many aspects
of combat modeling that are highly uncertain and not knowable (an unresolvable uncertainty
(Bankes, 1993)). This drives the analyst to fill knowledge gaps with best guesses for critical
parameters, processes, tactics, and future force mix, when representing red and blue forces.
This in of itself does not doom the utility of analysis of combat with modeling and simulation,
but coupled with the fact that there is limited data with which to validate such tools, there is no
way to determine an absolute bound on the impact assumptions have on simulation output in
an uncertain environment. It may be possible to validate individual pieces of a combat
simulation, such as the performance of a specific radar on a specific platform. However,
assessing the predictive capability of a simulation across even a modest subset of mission
aspects against current and future threats is impossible. Attempts have been made to validate
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combat models in aggregate with historical data (Schramm, 2012), but this is of little value as
the models themselves require heavy modification to incorporate modern or future forces,
requiring their own distinct validation, which is also impossible.
The distinction between uncertainty, variability and error in a modeling and simulation
study has not been consistently employed within the vocabulary of the analytical community
(Oberkampf, 2002). The risk analysis literature delineates between uncertainty and error, with
uncertainties being further refined into epistemic and aleatory categories. This framework is
akin to the colloquial use of the terms uncertainty, variability, and error within a modeling and
simulation context. Uncertainties can manifest as either simulation output variation (aleatory
uncertainties) or unquantified decision risk (if epistemic uncertainties are not enumerated and
relevant inputs varied within the study).
Additionally, error is defined as “a recognizable inaccuracy in any phase or activity of
modeling and simulation that is not due to lack of knowledge” (Oberkampf, 2002:334).
Unfortunately this has the connotation that the modeler or analyst has done something
“wrong”, which may not be the case. While unacknowledged errors are the term that describes
inadvertent errors made by the modeler, of interest for this paper are the acknowledged errors
or errors resulting from a choice in system abstraction or simulation implementation process.
The impact of such errors in a simulation study results in biased simulation output or
explainable deviation from “truth”. In a similar fashion to both epistemic and aleatory
uncertainty, certain forms of error could be systematically explored to identify sensitivities to
choices made by the analyst.
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Within the combat modeling community there have been several suggestions for
exploring uncertainties associated with the domain (Bankes, 1993; Davis, 2000; Dewar, 1996).
However, the output of these approaches does not clearly communicate the uncertainties that
are buried within the inputs. In Chapter III, Evidence Theory was demonstrated as a framework
for representing epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling output. The steps for aggregating
multiple, conflicting sources for simulation input data were demonstrated with a simple
Lanchester model incorporating six uncertain factors. The analysis found that the proposed
uncertainty configuration induced a large gap between the cumulative plausibility and belief
functions for blue minus red residual forces, indicating large uncertainty in combat outcomes.
This research was extended in Chapter IV by developing a sensitivity analysis method for
identifying the factors which contribute to the overall uncertainty in simulation output. Prior
approaches to this problem implemented a variance based metric for factor prioritization
(Helton, 2006), which requires a second analysis, or is susceptible to ties when large
uncertainties are present (Guo, 2007). In a resource constrained environment, sensitivity
analysis methods would facilitate prioritization of resources with the goal of reducing
uncertainty in system performance.
In the weather domain, there are several errors and uncertainties that contribute to the
difficulties with single model analyses, some of which are (Palmer, 2004):
o The physics of weather is well understood, but the phenomena are chaotic and
models are sensitive to initial conditions
o Solutions to the partial differential equations that describe weather phenomena
must be reduced to analytically tractable forms, which introduces computation
error in final solutions
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o There are numerous ways to implement approximations of the underlying
physics and numerical approximations
o There is no underlying framework from which a pdf of model uncertainty can be
estimated.
Despite these uncertainties and errors, seasonal forecasts have been shown to have better
predictive capability when several independent models are analyzed together, commonly
referred to as a multi-model ensemble (Tebaldi, 2007), than when the individual predictions of
those models are taken alone. Developers of multi-model ensembles must consider both the
number and composition of models within the ensemble as well as the method of data
aggregation and assessment of ensemble predictive skill.
Multi-model predictive superiority is not only due to error compensation, but primarily
by its improved consistency and reliability across the entire predictive region (Hagedorn, 2005).
A particular ensemble may not be the best forecast at each point within the predictive region,
but generally outperforms any given individual model over the full range of cases. The success
of multi-model methods in the weather community has led to the development of analogous
approaches in prediction of disease outbreak (Morse, 2005) and rainfall runoff (Ajami, 2007).
Since there is limited data for combat model validation, the techniques for aggregation
in multi-model ensembles for weather forecasting are not appropriate. There would be no way
to confirm that the aggregated ensemble provides any predictive improvement over any
individual simulation response. This paper develops a method to quantify the impact of error or
modeling choices on simulation output uncertainty in settings where multiple models are
employed. This would yield insight into the overall sensitivities of the system with respect to
multiple modeling choices. The objective is not to make weakly predictive models strongly
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predictive models, but to improve the insight gained through a modeling and simulation
activity.
This chapter is organized into five major sections: Introduction, Background,
Methodology, Results and Discussion, and Conclusion. The Introduction provides a general
overview of the context for the research in quantifying the impact of error on simulation output
uncertainty. The Background section provides a review of literature discussing sources of
uncertainties and error in the modeling and simulation process and Evidence Theory as a
representation of uncertainty in combat modeling and simulation. A novel approach to
quantifying the impact of error on simulation output uncertainty is presented in the
Methodology section. This method is demonstrated using three distinct Lanchester models of
conflict. The results of this analysis and a discussion of interesting features from this application
is provided in the Results and Discussion section. In the Conclusions section, a summary of the
research context, contributions, and future work are identified.

5.2

Background
5.2.1 Sources of Uncertainties and Error in the Modeling and Simulation Process
Oberkampf (2002) provides a framework for discussing variability and error in a

modeling and simulation study. This framework proposes two kinds of uncertainty and the
notion of error within a modeling and simulation context that are akin to the colloquial use of
the terms uncertainty, variability, and error used in the operations research community. Using
their definition, aleatory uncertainty “describes the inherent variation associated with a
physical system or environment under consideration” (Oberkampf, 2002:334). This could be

98

thought of as the defect rate in a manufacturing process, where the same physical processes
occur repeatedly, yet each part does not come off the production line exactly to specification.
Similar terms for aleatory uncertainty include variability, stochastic variability, or irreducible
uncertainty. A second category of uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty was defined as “the
potential deficiency in any phase or activity of the modeling process that is due to lack of
knowledge” (Oberkampf, 2002:334). This category is difficult to conceptualize in most process
flow modeling and simulation contexts where any potential epistemic uncertainty could be
resolved by simply inspecting the process as it occurs. Epistemic uncertainty does manifest in
the materials science and engineering realm, where certain model parameters would require
materials testing at high temperatures and current methods preclude collecting this data.
These two types of uncertainty are related in that their impact manifests as either
simulation output variation or unquantified decision risk. It’s easy to see how a simulation
process that includes some representation of the aleatory uncertainties results in variation in
simulation output through replication, either within run or run-to-run. Epistemic uncertainties
can also induce variation in simulation output if assumptions regarding unknown aspects are
enumerated and relevant inputs varied within the study. Of more concern is when epistemic
uncertainties are not explicitly varied within a simulation, providing no insight into the
sensitivity of simulation responses to assumptions for the analyst, resulting in unquantified
decision risk. It is likely that the systematic varying of assumptions associated with epistemic
uncertainties will not cover all unique possibilities, but at least relative impacts can be
identified and presented to the study stakeholders to qualitatively include in their
deliberations.
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The popular terminology typically stops at this point with variability commonly referring
specifically to aleatory uncertainty and uncertainty to epistemic uncertainty. There is a third
useful distinction to make alongside the two types of uncertainty that classifies cases where
choices in model abstraction and software implementation have an appreciable impact on the
form of the simulation. In the manufacturing example, the modeler could choose to implement
their simulation with either discrete event or agent based perspective. This choice impacts
decisions that are made in the process of abstracting the physical system for simulation,
changing system representation in either a satisfactory or unsatisfactory fashion. In this case,
the effect on simulation output due to the selected modeling paradigm is related to neither the
natural variability of the process or elements that are unknowable regarding the system under
study. To account for this scenario, Oberkampf (2002) proposes the concept of simulation
error. They define simulation error as “a recognizable inaccuracy in any phase or activity of
modeling and simulation that is not due to lack of knowledge” (Oberkampf, 2002:334).
Unfortunately this has the connotation that someone has done something “wrong”, which may
not be the case. While unacknowledged errors are the term that describes errors made by the
modeler, of more interest for this discussion are the acknowledged errors or errors resulting
from a choice in abstraction or simulation implementation process. The impact of error in a
simulation study results in biased simulation output or explainable deviation from “truth”. In a
similar fashion to both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, certain forms of error could be
systematically explored to identify sensitivities to choices by the analyst.
The Society for Modeling and Simulation (1979) provides a simple framework to
understand how error and uncertainty arise throughout the modeling and simulation process
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(Figure 30). This framework consists of three core elements; Reality, Conceptual Model, and
Computerized Model. These elements are connected via the processes of Analysis,
Programming, and Computer Simulation. Model Qualification, Verification, and Validation
provide feedback from “upstream” elements to ensure the simulation processes generate a
suitable product based on its preceding elements.

Figure 30: Society for Modeling and Simulation Framework for Simulation (SCS, 1979)

The types of uncertainty and error manifest themselves at different elements and steps
throughout the modeling process. Aleatory uncertainties are manifest in reality. For all practical
uses their induced stochastic behavior can be measured to suitable precision and have little
impact on the remainder of the modeling process (although downstream processes may adjust
how they are represented in computer code). Epistemic uncertainties manifest while
developing a mental model of reality. Here the modeler aggregates what is known and what
can be observed and, especially in combat modeling, makes educated assumptions when
significant items are unknown or are known to exist, but are unobservable. Error manifests in
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both the construction of a mental model and in implementing the model in code. Classic
manifestations as part of the programming process are code errors or “bugs”, which are
classified as unacknowledged errors. Examples of acknowledged errors would be recognizable
simplifications/assumptions that are made throughout the abstraction process. The key here is
that these features are recognizable when comparing the conceptual model with reality. In
operations research parlance, these are referred to as uncertainties or structural uncertainties.
However, these are really identifiable discrepancies between reality and the way the modeler
has chosen to represent the system and thus, error. Sometimes software, processing hardware,
etc. limit the implementation of reality in code. These are also errors by our definition. In this
way, the modeling process can be thought of as representing the system while meeting a
suitable error threshold, as measured during the model validation process.
To address the treatment of uncertainty and error, Bankes (1993) proposes two
modeling paradigms: exploratory vs. consolidative modeling. Consolidative modeling is the
process of building a model by consolidating known facts into a single package and then using it
as a surrogate for the actual system. In contrast with consolidative modeling, the exploratory
modeling approach is the use of a series of experiments to explore the implications of
assumptions when unresolvable uncertainties preclude building a surrogate for the system. The
power of the consolidative approach lies in the assumption that the performance of the model
has been compared to reality and the accuracy of the model is known to some precision (i.e.
the model can be validated (Figure 31)). In situations where this is not feasible or where
important facts about the system under study are uncertain, Bankes (1993) suggests that the
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exploratory modeling approach is preferable, and that treating such an endeavor as if it were a
consolidative modeling effort is perilous.

Figure 31: Consolidative vs Exploratory Modeling

Considering these issues, Dewar (1996) developed a topology of uses of distributed, real
time simulations that, among other distinctions, delineated between strongly predictive and
weakly predictive uses of these simulations. One factor this topology used to distinguish among
possible uses of combat models was their ability to be validated. Strongly predictive models are
described as having a demonstrated capacity to forecast outcomes with a high degree of
accuracy (i.e. can be validated). Examples of these types of models include engineering or
physics based models to predict part life, strength, fatigue characteristics, etc. Alternatively,
weakly predictive models suffer from moderate to high levels of parametric, structural, or other
uncertainties. Yet, the model still captures enough of the critical elements of the system under
study to be useful in exploratory analysis. While these models may not be validated in the
quantitative sense, they often rely on softer forms of validation (i.e. “face validation”). Millar
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(2016) extended this idea, arguing the taxonomy applied to combat models in general. Due to
the uncertainties inherent to combat, models of combat, to include Live-Virtual-Constructive
simulations (LVCs), are generally considered weakly predictive simulations and thought to be
most appropriately used for exploratory purposes.

5.2.2 Analysis of Uncertainty with Evidence Theory
There is a growing body of work in applying Evidence Theory, as a framework for
systematic exploration and quantification of uncertainty in modeling and simulation. The theory
was first introduced by Dempster (1967) and later codified by Shafer (1976). Applications can
be found in several scientific fields, such as space launch and nuclear power plant design (Sentz,
2002). Evidence theory differs from probability theory in that likelihood is assigned to sets (i.e.
a range of parameter values) instead of being assigned to a probability density function. By
explicitly defining ranges of uncertain input parameters and propagating them through a
model, evidence theory bounds the true cumulative density function for a response. There are
three key functions in Evidence Theory; the basic probability assignment function (BPA or m),
the Belief function (Bel) and the Plausibility function (Pl).
In general the basic probability assignment is not equivalent to probability as discussed
in classical probability theory (although connections exist (Sentz, 2002)). Similarly to classical
probability theory, the basic probability assignment is a mapping of all sets (X, the power set) to
the interval [0, 1] and the sum of all assignments across subsets is 1. Formally, this is
represented as:
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𝑚𝑚: 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) → [0, 1]

(38)

∑𝐴𝐴 ∈𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) 𝑚𝑚(𝐴𝐴) = 1

(40)

𝑚𝑚(∅) = 0

(39)

Using these basic probability assignments, upper and lower bounds for an interval can be
calculated. The lower bound (or Belief), for a set A (subset of X), is the sum of all basic
probability assignments of the proper subsets (B) of the set of interest (A).

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝐴𝐴) = ∑𝐵𝐵|𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵)

(41)

The upper bound (or Plausibility) is the sum of all the basic probability assignments of the sets
(B) that intersect the set of interest (A).

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) = ∑𝐵𝐵|𝐵𝐵 ∩ 𝐴𝐴 ≠ ∅ 𝑚𝑚(𝐵𝐵)

(42)

The rules of combination in Evidence Theory allow data to be aggregated across
multiple, potentially conflicting sources within a common frame of discernment. For the
simulation context discussed in this research, these sources could be a set of epistemically
uncertain inputs for a single simulation model or the individual combat models in a multi-model
ensemble. This process assumes that the sources are independent (Shafer, 1976), however this
requirement is not rigorously established in practice (Tebaldi, 2007). There are many rules for
combining evidence; the key to identifying the most appropriate method is to determine how
conflict between sources should be considered. A survey of relevant combination rules is
provided below.
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Dempster’s combination rule was the original combination operator that drove the
conception of D-S theory. Using Dempster’s combination rule, the basic probability assignments
from two (or more) sources is combined with a purely conjunctive operation. The formal
definition of this operation (𝑚𝑚12 ) is below:
𝑚𝑚12 =

∑𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)
1− 𝐾𝐾

𝑚𝑚12 (∅) = 0

𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 = ∅

where 𝐾𝐾 = ∑𝐵𝐵∩𝐶𝐶=∅ 𝑚𝑚1 (𝐵𝐵)𝑚𝑚2 (𝐶𝐶)

(43)
(44)
(45)

It is important to note that this operation results in an aggregated mass only for intervals which
overlap, giving zero mass to regions where evidence existed but did not overlap with another
method. The measure of non-overlapping probability mass (or conflict) is represented by the
computation of K.
The aggregated masses are normalized based on K to achieve a basic probability
assignment function that resembles a probability density function from classical probability
theory. Unfortunately, this choice can lead to counterintuitive results in situations involving
high levels of conflict. These shortcomings are detailed in (Zadeh, 1984). Recognizing the
potential pitfall, numerous other combination rules have been developed which account for
level of conflict differently (see (Sentz, 2002) and (Yao, 1994) for many examples).
The Mixing Rule of combination is a popular mechanism for aggregation of disjunctive
evidence (see equation (46)). This rule averages the masses (mi) associated with a particular
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interval across all i estimates (i from 1 to n). The individual estimates can be weighted based on
reliability by the multiplier, w, where each wi is the reliability associated with the ith source.
𝑛𝑛

1
𝑚𝑚1…𝑛𝑛 (𝐴𝐴) = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (𝐴𝐴)
𝑛𝑛

(46)

𝑖𝑖=1

In contrast with Dempster’s Rule of combination, evidence in conflict is preserved in the
resulting BPA. Said another way, the full range of possibilities expressed in the sources are
represented in the final BPA. This feature is particularly beneficial where the application of
evidence theory is not to identify the most likely distribution of a particular metric, but to
express the full range the distribution could be.

5.2.3 Lanchester’s Model of Armed Conflict
Lanchester’s Square Law (equations (47) and (48)) were developed to model combat
between two homogeneous forces where both forces use aimed fire, target acquisition time
does not depend on the number of targets, target acquisition time is factored into the
firepower coefficients, and the firepower coefficients are constant over time (MORS, 1994).

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

= −α ∗ y(t) where x(0) = X0
= −β ∗ x(t) where y(0) = Y0

(47)
(48)

The equations model the change of a given force level (x(t)) as a function of the opposing force
level (y(t)) over time, given initial force sizes and estimates of the firepower coefficients. Using
107

these equations, various quantities of interest can be explored, such as: who wins the conflict,
residual forces, and duration of conflict (Figure 32).

Example of Lanchester's Model of Armed Conflict

Force Size

700
600

Blue Force (x)

500

Red Force (y)

400
300

Lanchester
Parameters:
x0 = 800

200

y0 = 500
α = 0.15

100
0

β = 0.45
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Time

Figure 32: Example of Lanchester’s Model of Armed Conflict

Lanchester’s equations are appealing in part, due to their simplicity, transparency and
ease of implementation. Combat analysts have employed them in assessments of several
conflicts including; the Ardennes Campaign, the Battle of Kursk, and Iwo Jima (Bracken, 1995;
Lucas, 2004; Schramm, 2012). However, there are numerous sources in the literature that
identify deficiencies of a Lanchester model of armed conflict (Tolk, 2012). Taylor (1983)
consolidates these into a single list, several of which are provided below as reference:
•

No force movement

•

Not verified by history
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•

No way to predict attrition rate coefficients

•

Tactical decision processes not considered

•

Battlefield intelligence not considered

•

Command, control, and communications not considered

•

Effects of terrain not considered

•

Target priority/fire allocation not explicitly considered

•

Noncombat losses are not considered
Despite these criticisms, many variants of Lanchester’s equations have been developed.

Extensions include incorporation of heterogeneous forces, stochastic attrition processes,
reinforcements, logistics and maintenance and breakpoints (Tolk, 2012). In a more modern
setting, the effects of network disruptions were represented as piecewise firepower
coefficients (Schramm, 2012), enabling assessment of the impact of cyber effects on combat
outcomes. Kelton (2010) describes a Lanchester model with stopping levels and stochastic
reinforcements for both red and blue forces. This model was designed for implementation and
analysis in the Arena discrete event simulation tool.

5.2.4 Evidence Theory Representations of Uncertainty in Combat Modeling and
Simulation
In Chapter III, Evidence Theory was demonstrated as a framework for representing
epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling output. There were 6 epistemically uncertain inputs;
initial force levels, attrition coefficients, and stopping level for both red and blue sides. For
demonstration purposes, all six uncertain factors in the Lanchester model were represented
with the same scaled BPA which was constructed using the Mixing Rule of combination. The
109

analysis found that the proposed uncertainty configuration induced a large gap between the
cumulative plausibility (CPF) and belief (CBF) functions for blue minus red residual forces,
indicating large uncertainty in combat outcomes.
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0
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1200

Blue Minus Red Residual Forces
Cum. Plausibility

Cum. Belief

Figure 33: Evidence Theory Representation of Uncertainty

The demonstration of Evidence Theory as a framework for representing outcomes in
combat modeling and simulation addresses several key gaps in the literature and common
practice. First, is the propensity to treat combat simulation output as predictive when, upon
examining what is known and unknown regarding the model inputs, it clearly is not. This is
addressed by supplementing the single output probability density functions with cumulative
belief and plausibility functions from evidence theory. These functions represent bounds on
probability densities given an input uncertainty specification (or basic probability assignment).
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Common summary statistics (e.g. mean, probability intervals, etc.) are in the form of ranges,
which discourage the propensity to treat point estimates from a simulation as predictive.
Second, is that the employment of the Evidence Theory rules of combination eliminates
the need to make choices about how to use multiple, potentially conflicting sources for
modeling and simulation inputs. In the presence of multiple inputs, traditional approaches
typically follow one of two lines of thought: 1) condense the sources into a single point
estimate or 2) employ the Laplace principle of maximum entropy and assume a uniform
distribution over the range of possible values. The validity of these approaches is heavily
influenced by the process by which the sources are condensed to either a point estimate or
range. In practice, these methods are unstructured and not well documented. In contrast,
Evidence Theory provides a structure for aggregating multiple, conflicting sources in a
repeatable manner without making assumptions regarding the distribution of the true value of
the input.
In Chapter IV, the work of Chapter III was extended by developing a new method for
sensitivity analysis of uncertainty in Evidence Theory. This sensitivity analysis method generates
marginal CPFs and CBFs and prioritizes the contribution of each factor in reducing the
Wasserstein distance (also known as the Kantorovich or Earth mover’s distance) between the
CBF and CPF. Using this method, a rank ordering of the model or simulation input factors was
produced.
This method is notable in several respects. First, it employs the stepwise construction of
CBFs and CBFs as described in Helton (2006) and a statistical measure of distance as in Guo
(2007). Guo (2007) employs the K-S distance which has been demonstrated to be susceptible to
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ties when there are large uncertainties in outcomes with respect to the variables. The
Wasserstein distance, however is not likely to cause ties in the procedure except when the
variables under analysis have very little relationship to the uncertainty in model outcomes,
where they exhibit marginal CPFs and CBFs similar to Figure 21.
A significant difference between the method proposed by Helton (2006) and the one
presented here, is that no preliminary exploratory sensitivity analysis procedure is required.
Such a procedure is good practice, but not integrally linked in the new method. A modification
of this procedure could be produced where it is used (as in Helton (2006)) to incrementally
construct estimates of CBFs and CPFs by adding variables until the functions stop changing
enough to warrant further computation.
To demonstrate the stepwise sensitivity analysis procedure, a hypothetical military
conflict modeled by Lanchester’s Square Law with stopping level (a force level for both red and
blue where the conflict ends) for both red and blue forces was analyzed. This overall
experimental setup is exactly the same as described in Chapter III, were each Ei was estimated
with an enumeration approach. As such; a more detailed explanation of the Lanchester model
used can be found in sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.1 and more details regarding the construction of
the BPAs and design matrix for this demonstration can be found in section 3.4.1. Once the
simulation runs were complete, the marginal sensitivity of the model factors and overall
contribution to the belief and plausibility functions were computed for blue minus red residual
forces.
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Figure 34: Sensitivity Analysis Summary of Blue minus Red Residual Forces

A relative prioritization of the factors was produced, where five of six factors had
distinct contributions in explaining total uncertainty while a sixth did not. The ordered
importance of the variables on total uncertainty was red attrition coefficient, blue attrition
coefficient, red initial force level, blue initial force level, red stopping level and blue stopping
level. While the specific results of this analysis are not extensible, they are a useful example for
how to apply sensitivity analysis with Evidence Theory in modeling, simulation and analysis
activities.
Implementing these methods does not come without cost. Managing multiple sources
and choosing the appropriate Evidence Theory rule of combination add additional complexity
to the overall analysis. The need to estimate the maximum and minimum response in each
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input’s basic probability assignment interval intersections can drive significant increases in the
number of required simulation runs. Large run matrices can be mitigated through the
employment of design of experiments and meta-modeling. These costs are offset by the clarity
provided to the decision maker regarding how uncertainties in modeling and simulation inputs
affect the analysis outcomes.

5.3

Methodology
This research demonstrates the quantification of model error, when multiple models are

employed in the analysis of a similar context. This method treats the multiple models as an
epistemically uncertain quantity with an assumed BPA. Evidence Theory can then be used as in
Chapter III to compute a CBF and CPF which treats the error in model form as an uncertain
factor as well as the epistemically uncertain factors. The model error and uncertain factors can
then be prioritized using the stepwise procedure developed in Chapter IV. The relative
importance of the model error relative to the real, uncertain physical factors may drive a
different interpretation of the output of the individual models. If the model error explains little
of the uncertainty in the data, then the decision maker might be more qualitatively confident in
the broad conclusions taken from the ensemble of models. Conversely, if model error explains
much of the uncertainty in the data, then the decision maker should consider an alternate way
to rationalize their decision making. The subsequent sections detail the methods for generating
the CBF and CPF for an ensemble of models, a procedure for prioritization of the uncertainties
and modeling error, and describe a combat scenario used to demonstrate the method.
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5.3.1 Propagating Uncertainty through Models and Computing CPFs and CBFs
Evidence Theory provides a statistical framework for aggregating multiple, potentially
conflicting estimates for a simulation factor. The uncertainty in the simulation inputs is then
mapped to the simulation output by feeding the input intervals through the model. This process
generally requires the formation of basic probability assignments for uncertain factors, the
development of a design matrix to collect data from the simulation, execution of the simulation
runs, estimation of simulation output uncertainty intervals, and, finally, the computation of
cumulative plausibility and belief functions.
Formally, the evidence space for a given simulation input is (x, X, mx). Where x is the set
of all possible values for that input, X is the set of subsets of x (Ui’s) that represent the interval
estimates for the input, and mx is the vector of masses associated with each element of X (Ui).
The evidence space for the corresponding simulation output is (y, Y, my). Where y is the set of
all possible values for that output, Y is the set of subsets of y (Ei’s) that represent the interval
estimates for the output, and my is the vector of masses associated with each element of Y (Ei).
In the case of uncertain model inputs, all that is known is X (Ui’s) and Y (Ei’s) is not. The Ei’s are
thus properly considered estimates based on propagation of a corresponding Ui, and identifying
the minimums and maximums produced by that input interval. The mass for a given Ei (my) is
assigned based on the corresponding Ui. If a given Ui produced an Ei, its mass (mx) becomes the
new mass (my) associated with the new Ei, Finally, the cumulative plausibility and belief
functions were computed using equations (41) and (42).

115

5.3.2 Stepwise Procedure for Prioritization of Epistemic Uncertainties and Modeling
Error
The intuitive notion behind sensitivity analysis in Evidence Theory is to identify which
variables reduce the area between the CPF and CBF and by how much (Ferson, 2006). In
classical probability theory, the area between two cumulative density functions is known as the
Wasserstein metric (Rüschendorf, 2001),

𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝 (𝜇𝜇, 𝑣𝑣) ≔

1/𝑃𝑃
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�∫𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)�
𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(𝜇𝜇, 𝑣𝑣)

(49)

where (M, d) is a metric space and for p ≥ 1, Pp(M) is the collection of all measures µ, v on M
with finite pth moment. This measure is also known as the Kantorovich or Earth movers distance
in the computer science community.
In our setting, we can greatly simplify this expression for the 1 dimensional case,
resulting in the following expression (Rüschendorf, 2001):

∞

𝑊𝑊1 (𝜇𝜇, 𝑣𝑣) = ∫−∞�𝐹𝐹𝜇𝜇 (𝑥𝑥) − 𝐺𝐺𝑣𝑣 (𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.

(50)

This measure satisfies the requirements for non-negativity, symmetry, definiteness, and
triangle inequality, qualifying it as a true metric in the framework presented in 4.2.2. Also,
assuming the body of evidence results in BPAs that meet the criteria for probability density
functions, the Evidence Theory and classical probability theory representation of this metric are
equivalent. 𝐹𝐹𝜇𝜇 and 𝐺𝐺𝑣𝑣 represent the CBF and CPF, respectively, for a given variable.
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The Wasserstein metric, in combination with a stepwise procedure to generate marginal
CBF and CPFs can be used to develop a ranking of the variables impact on uncertainty. Once the
procedures for analyzing uncertainties using modeling and simulation are complete
(aggregating multiple inputs to form BPAs for each factor, propagating them through a model
or simulation, and generating the CPF and CBF of the resulting measure of interest), the
methodology is as follows:
5. Let 𝛷𝛷 = {1, … , 𝑛𝑛} be the set of all uncertain variable indices (including model error)
under consideration for this analysis (where n is the number of variables) and 𝛺𝛺 =
{ }.
6. Iteration k: for each variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝛷𝛷;

a. Estimate a CPF and a CBF for y on the basis of the evidence space obtained from
the original evidence space for the xi, the original evidence space(s) for any
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , ∀𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝛺𝛺, and degenerate evidence spaces for all other variables (in which the
sample spaces are assigned BPAs of 1).
b. Calculate 𝑊𝑊1𝑖𝑖 between marginal CPF and CBF for variable i.

7. Select variable 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝛷𝛷, that minimizes 𝑊𝑊1. . Remove s from set 𝛷𝛷 and add to set 𝛺𝛺.
�1𝑘𝑘 = 𝑊𝑊1𝑠𝑠 .
Let 𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘 = 𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠 , where 𝑥𝑥� is and ordering of x and 𝑊𝑊

8. Increment k and repeat steps (2) and (3) until 𝛷𝛷 = { }.

At the conclusion of this procedure, 𝑥𝑥� will contain the prioritized list of factors where 𝑥𝑥�1 is the

most important for explaining the uncertainty in simulation output and 𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛 is the least.
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5.3.3

Error Prioritization Methodology Demonstration

To demonstrate the methodology from sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, a hypothetical military
conflict modeled by Lanchester’s Square Law with a stopping level (a force level for both red
and blue where the conflict ends) and reinforcements is analyzed for three distinct models
(Table 11). In Model 1, reinforcements are modeled as occurring at a constant time interval
with a fixed number of reinforcements for each side. Model 2 considers stochastic
reinforcements with poison inter-arrival times and exponential numbers of reinforcements.
Model 3 does not implement reinforcement behavior, although it is explicitly stated as part of
the problem statement. This represents the situation where an existing modeling framework
does not account for all aspects of the mission under study and there are neither sufficient
resources nor time to develop the appropriate capability.

Table 11: Models for Reinforcements
Blue
Every 6 time
units
Poisson(λ = 6
time units)

Number of
Reinforcements
20 units/time
unit
Exp(µ = 20
units/time unit)

Every 3 time
units
Poisson(λ = 3
time units)

Number of
Reinforcements
25 units/time
unit
Exp(µ = 25
units/time unit)

-

-

-

-

Arrivals
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

Red
Arrivals

As in Chapter III, there are 6 key uncertain inputs; initial force levels, attrition
coefficients, and stopping level for both red and blue sides. These inputs are presumed to be
epistemically uncertain and that the analyst has been given ranges for each input (see Table
12). In reality it is unlikely that all input quantities are epistemically uncertain, but were made
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so in this instance to introduce sufficient complexity to establish viability of uncertainty
quantification approaches. In this situation, it is assumed that blue minus red residual forces is
the primary metric of interest.

Table 12: Summary of Uncertain Inputs for Error Prioritization Demonstration
Inputs

Uncertainty

X1

Blue Initial Force Size (X0)

[900, 1000]

X2

Red Initial Force Size (Y0)

[400, 500]

X3

Blue Attrition Coefficient (α)

[0.15, 0.25]

X4

Red Attrition Coefficient (β)

[0.3, 0.45]

X5

Blue Stopping Level

[0, 50]

X6

Red Stopping Level

X7

Model

[0, 25]
[Model 1,
Model 2,
Model 3]

The BPA for X1 through X6, was constructed based on estimates from three experts for
the uncertain parameter values. The BPA for Model, X7, in this analysis is constructed as if the
organization was asked: “Which method is the most appropriate for estimating blue minus red
residual forces in this setting?” It is presumed that each organization (or expert) would
emphatically vote that their model would be the best. Using the mixing rule of combination
(with equal weights across the expert estimates), an overall BPA that spreads the mass evenly
across the three models was produced. The evidence configuration for X1 through X6 is
assumed to be the same as in Chapter III (Figure 13) with the same resulting scaled BPA (Figure
15) constructed using the mixing rule of combination.
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Two possible approaches to estimating the yi’s and Ei’s would be to use a meta-model or
enumerating a large number of possibilities explicitly with the simulation. Neither approach
guarantees that the global maximum or minimums have been found, which is why these
quantities are frequently referred to as estimates for E. In either case, the analyst must choose
a sampling procedure. The literature contains many examples of the sampling based
approached, including random sampling, factorial experiments, and space filling designed
experiments (Ankenman, 2012; Kleijnen, 2006). However, if a meta-model is to be used, care
should be taken to ensure that the resulting model is statistically valid. To avoid this difficulty
and to demonstrate the concept of Evidence Theory as a viable method for assessing modeling
error in combat modeling, an enumeration approach was selected. The Ei’s were estimated by
taking the maximum and minimum from running the factorial combination of the endpoints of
the Ui’s resulting in 6^6*2^6 (2,985,984) runs for each simulation.

5.4

Results and Discussion
5.4.1

Uncertainty Analysis of Each Simulation Model

The resulting CBF and CPF and a prioritization of the uncertain factors was constructed
for each simulation model to provide context for the multi-model analysis and resulting error
prioritization (Figures 35, 36, & 37; Tables 13, 14, 15, & 16). Each simulation model produced a
slightly different priority order of the uncertain factor effects on uncertainty (Table 13). Red
Initial Force Size (X2), Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3), and Red Firepower Coefficient (X4) were
always the first three most important variables, but varied in specific order depending on the
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method for modeling reinforcements. Blue Firepower Coefficient (X1), Red Stopping Level (X6),
and Blue Stopping Level (X5) were always 4th, 5th, and 6th most important respectively.

Table 13: Prioritization of Factor Effects on Uncertainty
Prioritization of Factor Effects on Uncertainty
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
1
X4
X3
X4
2
X2
X2
X3
3
X3
X4
X2
4
X1
X1
X1
5
X6
X6
X6
6
X5
X5
X5
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Figure 35: Summary of Uncertain Factor Prioritization for Model 1
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Table 14: Summary of Wasserstein Distance for Model 1
Summary of Wasserstein Distance – Model 1
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Initial Blue Forces (X1)
812
611
708
397
Initial Red Forces (X2)
707
580
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3) 782
586
470
Red Firepower Coefficient (X4) 696
Blue Stopping Level (X5)
1009
695
580
470
Red Stopping Level (X6)
1011
688
568
457

Step 5
397
381

Step 6
381
-

Sensitivity Analysis Summary - Model 2
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Figure 36: Summary of Uncertain Factor Prioritization for Model 2
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Table 15: Summary of Wasserstein Distance for Model 2
Summary of Wasserstein Distance – Model 2
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Initial Blue Forces (X1)
1324
1076
882
720
Initial Red Forces (X2)
1270
996
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3) 1204
Red Firepower Coefficient (X4) 1283
1004
840
Blue Stopping Level (X5)
1355
1143
938
784
Red Stopping Level (X6)
1357
1154
939
780

Step 5
663
660

Step 6
591
-

Sensitivity Analysis Summary - Model 3
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Figure 37: Summary of Uncertain Factor Prioritization for Model 3
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Table 16: Summary of Wasserstein Distance for Model 3
Summary of Wasserstein Distance – Model 3
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
714
597
499
Initial Blue Forces (X1)
401
683
Initial Red Forces (X2)
574
570
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3) 685
476
Red Firepower Coefficient (X4) 673
810
673
570
476
Blue Stopping Level (X5)
793
661
560
458
Red Stopping Level (X6)

5.4.2

Step 5
401
386

Step 6
386
-

Error Quantification Using Evidence Theory

The multi-model analysis (or ensemble) produced a grand CPF and CBF and a
prioritization of error and epistemic uncertainties for blue minus red residual forces. In this
analysis the most important factor in total uncertainty was the method by which
reinforcements were modeled (X7). This factor was followed by Red Firepower Coefficient (X4),
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3), Red Initial Force Size (X2), Blue Firepower Coefficient (X1), Red
Stopping Level (X6), and Blue Stopping Level (X5) in order from most important to least.

124

Probability

Sensitivity Analysis Summary - Ensemble of Models
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Blue Minus Red Residual Forces
Cum. Plausibility - S5X1

Cum. Belief - S5X1

Cum. Plausibility - S4X2

Cum. Belief - S4X2

Cum. Plausibility - S3X3

Cum. Belief - S3X3

Cum. Plausibility - S2X4

Cum. Belief - S2X4

Cum. Plausibility - S7X5

Cum. Belief - S7X5

Cum. Plausibility - S6X6

Cum. Belief - S6X6

Cum. Plausibility - S1X7

Cum. Belief - S1X7

Figure 38: Summary of Uncertain Factor Prioritization for the Ensemble of Models

Table 17: Summary of Wasserstein Distance for the Ensemble of Models
Summary of Wasserstein Distance – Ensemble of Models
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
1324
950
791
628
Initial Blue Forces (X1)
505
1269
886
758
Initial Red Forces (X2)
595
890
Blue Firepower Coefficient (X3) 1204
720
Red Firepower Coefficient (X4) 1282
883
1354
1058
868
701
576
Blue Stopping Level (X5)
1356
1053
859
693
565
Red Stopping Level (X6)
Model (X7)
1075

Step 6
486
475
-

Step 7
452
-

This analysis highlights the commonly believed idea that choices in abstraction and
software implementation can induce uncertainties that overwhelm natural factors of the
system under study (Song, 2013). Despite this belief, systematic exploration of these choices is
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not revisited beyond the decision point. Using Evidence Theory and a multi-model framework
for analysis of combat can highlight the impact of these choices on simulation output and begin
a thoughtful dialog on how to best use simulation analysis as a decision making aid.
Seeing that the choice of how reinforcements are modeled is a significant driver of
uncertainty, a commander may pause and consider how best to use these results. Further, if a
commander was willing and able to specify a threshold for blue minus red for which the
strategic objectives for the wider conflict are achieved, then the range of probabilities
associated with that threshold could be identified. A sampling of some notional thresholds and
resulting probability of successfully achieving that objective is provided below for both the
baseline and Evidence Theory based analysis of uncertainty (Table 18). The individual method
and multi-model Evidence Theory representations of the probability of meeting the
commander’s thresholds for success are different, especially for lower threshold values.

Table 18: Probability of Achieving Blue minus Red Objective with Evidence Theory
Probability of Meeting Blue Minus Red Objective
Blue – Red
Threshold
750

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

[0.01, 0.97]

[0.01, 0.99]

[0.01, 0.96]

Ensemble of
Models
[0.01, 0.98]

650

[0.02, 1.0]

[0.01, 1.0]

[0.02, 1.0]

[0.02, 1.0]

550

[0.17, 1.0]

[0.05, 1.0]

[0.25, 1.0]

[0.16, 1.0]

450

[0.58, 1.0]

[0.27, 1.0]

[0.64, 1.0]

[0.50, 1.0]

Using this framework does not address the complicating factors which prevent model
validation in a combat analysis and the subsequent limits in quantified predictive capability –
the ensemble does not have any more provable predictive capability than any of its
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constituents. Representation of errors and uncertainties inherent to combat modeling by
employing multiple models and Evidence Theory improves conceptualization of uncertainty by
providing ranges instead of point values for metric output. Using this framework should reduce
the propensity to overlook these shortcomings when reviewing analysis output and inspire a
more thoughtful dialog on the causes of the range in possible outcomes observed during the
study.

5.5

Conclusion
This paper developed a method to prioritize the impact of error or modeling choices on

simulation output uncertainty in settings where multiple models are employed. Prior work on
representation of uncertainty in combat modeling and subsequent sensitivity analysis with
respect to uncertainty with Evidence Theory was used as the basis for providing a quantitative
understanding by treating model selection as an epistemically uncertain factor. This analysis
provides insight into the overall sensitivities of the system with respect to multiple modeling
choices. The ensemble is never the best or always the worst in terms of range in uncertainty,
which is consistent with weather ensemble performance. However, the new method does not
make weakly predictive models strongly predictive models, but it does ensure a plurality of
perspectives are considered during a modeling and simulation activity.
This method is demonstrated using three distinct Lanchester models of conflict. Each
model represented the arrival and number of reinforcements slightly differently but based on
the same scenario description. Upon analysis with Evidence Theory, each of these models
produced a slightly different rank ordering of the top three significant factors, while the bottom
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three factors were identically ranked. An analysis of the ensemble produced an aggregate
ranking of the factors, which identified the method by which reinforcements were modeled as
having the largest impact on uncertainty in blue minus red residual forces.
Within the combat modeling community there have been several suggestions for
exploring uncertainties (Bankes, 1993; Davis, 2000; Dewar, 1996). However, the output of these
approaches does not clearly communicate the uncertainties that are buried within the inputs.
The methods described in this chapter explicitly generate bounds, giving the decision maker the
opportunity to consider their use of the simulation output as part of their decision making
process.
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VI.

Conclusion

This research develops a comprehensive set of techniques for the treatment of
uncertainty and error in combat modeling and simulation analysis. Existing approaches within
the defense community for incorporating uncertain elements into simulation studies are ad hoc
with a significant number of tools that do not facilitate straight forward exploration of system
uncertainty. This problem is further compounded by the fact that there are multiple
overlapping simulation toolsets which, having been individually developed by domain experts
(aeronautics, signatures/sensing, communications, etc.), each have slightly different
representations of entities and environmental factors.
In Chapter III, Evidence Theory was demonstrated as a framework for representing
epistemic uncertainty in combat modeling output. The steps for aggregating multiple,
conflicting sources for simulation input data were demonstrated. A basic probability assignment
was assumed for six uncertain factors; initial force size, attrition coefficient and stopping level
for both blue and red forces in a Lanchester model of conflict. The analysis found that the
proposed uncertainty configuration induced a large gap between the cumulative plausibility
and belief functions for blue minus red residual forces, indicating large uncertainty in combat
outcomes. To provide context for the Evidence Theory analysis, a traditional approach was
employed in assessment of uncertainty of blue minus red residual forces in a Lanchester model
of conflict. The results of both analyses were compared and contrasted.
In Chapter IV, a new method for sensitivity analysis of uncertainty in Evidence Theory
was developed. This sensitivity analysis method generates marginal CPFs and CBFs and
prioritizes the contribution of each factor by the Wasserstein distance (also known as the
129

Kantorovich or Earth Mover’s distance) of the CBF and CPF. Using this method, a rank ordering
of the simulation input factors can be produced. This method combines positive elements from
the Evidence Theory literature; the stepwise construction of CBFs and CBFs and a statistical
measure of distance, the Wasserstein Distance. Published literature employs the K-S distance,
which has been demonstrated to be susceptible to ties when there are large uncertainties in
outcomes with respect to the variables. The Wasserstein distance, however is not likely to
cause ties in the procedure except when the variables under analysis have very little
relationship to the uncertainty in model outcomes, where they exhibit a large difference
between marginal CPFs and CBFs.
In Chapter V, a method to prioritize the impact of error or modeling choices on
simulation output uncertainty in settings where multiple models are employed. Prior work on
representation of uncertainty in combat modeling and subsequent sensitivity analysis with
respect to uncertainty with Evidence Theory was used as the basis for providing a quantitative
understanding by treating model selection as an epistemically uncertain factor. This analysis
provides insight into the overall sensitivities of the system with respect to multiple modeling
choices. The new method does not make weakly predictive models strongly predictive models,
but ensures a plurality of perspectives can be reconciled during a modeling and simulation
activity. This method is demonstrated using three distinct Lanchester models of conflict, each
with distinct representation of the arrival and volume of reinforcements based on the same
scenario description. Upon analysis, each of these models produced a slightly different rank
ordering of the top three significant factors, while the bottom three factors were identically
ranked. An analysis of the ensemble produced an aggregate ranking of the factors, which
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identified the method by which reinforcements were modeled as having the largest impact on
uncertainty in blue minus red residual forces.
The demonstration of Evidence Theory as a framework for representing outcomes in
combat modeling and simulation addresses several key gaps in the literature and common
practice. First, is the propensity to treat combat simulation output as predictive when, upon
examining what is known and unknown regarding the model inputs, it clearly is not. This is
addressed by supplementing the single output probability density functions with cumulative
belief and plausibility functions from evidence theory. These functions represent bounds on
probability densities given an input uncertainty specification (or basic probability assignment).
Common summary statistics (i.e. mean, probability intervals, etc.) are in the form of ranges,
which discourage the propensity to treat point estimates from a simulation as predictive.
Second, is that the employment of the Evidence Theory rules of combination eliminates
the need to make choices about how to use multiple, potentially conflicting sources for
modeling and simulation analysis and their required inputs. In the presence of multiple choices,
traditional approaches typically follow one of two lines of thought: 1) condense the sources into
a single point estimate or 2) employ the Laplace principle of maximum entropy and assume a
uniform distribution over the range of possible values. The validity of these approaches is
heavily influenced by the process by which the sources are condensed to either a point
estimate or range. In practice, these methods are unstructured and not well documented. In
contrast, Evidence Theory provides a structure for aggregating multiple, conflicting sources in a
repeatable manner without making assumptions regarding the distribution of the true value of
the input. While this discussion focuses on modeling and simulation inputs, the same logic
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applies when choosing the appropriate modeling and simulation framework, as demonstrated
in Chapter V.
Implementing these methods does not come without cost. Managing multiple sources
and choosing the appropriate Evidence Theory rule of combination add additional complexity
to the overall analysis. The need to estimate the maximum and minimum response in each
input’s basic probability assignment interval intersections can drive significant increases in the
number of required simulation runs. Large run matrices can be mitigated through the
employment of design of experiments and meta-modeling. These costs are offset by the clarity
provided to the decision maker regarding how uncertainties in modeling and simulation inputs
affect the analysis outcomes.

6.1

Future Research
There are several practical considerations for implementing these methods in a

systematic way. The most significant challenge may be the generation and maintenance of the
BPAs. Thinking in terms of uncertainty will be a challenge for some specialists, and it may
require significant encouragement to move them from the single parameter estimate mindset
to one that embraces multiple, potentially conflicting parameter estimates. A related challenge
will be deciding which factors for which BPAs should be constructed and used in analysis. It will
likely not be worth the effort to maintain BPAs for every factor, or even for every uncertain
factor.
This research developed a procedure to prioritize the sensitivities of a simulation
outcome to its input factors, assuming the BPAs were constructed from multiple independent
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estimators for each factor. An approach where the sensitivity of outcome uncertainty with
respect to individual estimators may be desirable. Estimators could be omitted from a factor’s
BPAs in a structured manner, propagated through the simulation, and the effect on outcome
uncertainty analyzed with a modified version of the methods from Chapter IV (Figure 39). This
level of insight could provide feedback to subject matter experts regarding which estimation
methods drive uncertainty and help them make decisions about how to appropriately calibrate
estimate weights.
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Figure 39: Sensitivity of Factor BPA to Removing an Expert Estimate
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